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Article 
Treaty Interpretation in WTO Dispute 
Settlement: The Outstanding Question of 
the Legality of Local Working 
Requirements+ 
Bryan Mercurio* and Mitali Tyagi** 
ABSTRACT 
This Article explores treaty interpretation in dispute 
settlement at the World Trade Organization (WTO) by seeking 
to resolve the unanswered question of whether local working 
requirements—domestic provisions which allow the grant of a 
compulsory license when a patent is not “worked” in that 
country—are legal under the international trade regime. The 
issue remains in flux as local working requirements appear to 
be inconsistent with the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
International Property Rights (TRIPS) Article 27, which 
prohibits discrimination as to “whether products are imported or 
locally produced.” However, TRIPS Article 2.2 incorporates the 
substantial majority of the Paris Convention, including Article 
5(A)(2), which may specifically allow working requirements. 
Analyzing the issue in strict adherence to the principles of 
treaty interpretation that guide decision-making in the WTO’s 
Dispute Settlement Body, we conclude that the incorporation of 
Article 5(A)(2) of the Paris Convention cannot be read down, and 
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thus working requirements are consistent with the TRIPS 
Agreement. This Article is therefore intentionally and 
unapologetically a technical analysis which evaluates and 
resolves a legal conflict using all available sources of law and is 
not a discussion of the policy rationale behind local working 
requirements. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The completion of the GATT Uruguay Round of trade 
negotiations transformed the international trading regime.1 The 
agreement,2 signed as a single undertaking by a large and 
diverse membership, created the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) and required the acceptance, in one sweep, of a complex 
maze of obligations aimed at liberalizing global trade.3 
In what has since been termed the “Grand Bargain,” 
proponents of including intellectual property rights into the 
international trading regime (most notably the United States, 
the European Community (EC), Switzerland, and Canada) 
traded access to their potentially lucrative textile and 
agricultural markets in exchange for increased intellectual 
property protection.4 The resulting negotiations culminated in 
 
 1. See generally DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY 
AND ANALYSIS (2d ed. 2003) (providing an in-depth examination of the negotiations); 
4 THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986–1994) (Terence P. 
Stewart ed., 1999) (providing an in-depth examination of the negotiations). 
 2. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994). 
 3. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, How to Promote the International Rule of Law? 
Contributions by the World Trade Organization Appellate Review System, 1 J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 25, 25–26 (1998) (stating that the agreement required “some 30 
multilateral international agreements with supplementary ‘Under-standings’, 
‘Protocols’, ‘Ministerial Decisions’, ‘Declarations’ and more than 30,000 pages of 
‘Schedules of Concessions’ for trade in goods and ‘Specific Commitments’ for trade in 
services” and “numerous references to other international agreements and general 
international law rules . . . and the ‘customary rules of interpretation of public 
international law’”). 
 4. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Ministerial Declaration on the 
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations of 20 September 1986, 25 I.L.M. 
1623, 1623 (1986) (detailing the framework for the negotiations); GATT Secretariat, 
Guidelines Proposed by the European Community for the Negotiations on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, MTN.GNG/NG11/W/16 (Nov. 20, 
1987) (laying out the European Community’s stance towards the negotiations); 
GATT Secretariat, United States Proposal for Negotiations on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights, MTN.GNG/NG11/W/14 (Oct. 20, 1987) (stating the 
United States’ stance towards the negotiations). See generally Jagdish Bhagwati, 
Commentary, Services and Intellectual Property Rights, in THE NEW GATT: 
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TRIPS.5 As a result, intellectual property now forms a part of an 
international trading regime enforceable through recourse to 
the “most formidable dispute settlement scheme of any 
international Organization”6—the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU). Administered by the Dispute Settlement 
Body (DSB), the DSU provides the substantive and procedural 
rules used to interpret and enforce as “hard law”7 the “global 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 111, 111–14 (Susan Collins & Barry 
Bosworth eds., 1994); SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE 
GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 96–120 (2003) (arguing that 
twelve corporations were responsible for the changes arising from the negotiations); 
Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, TRIPS and the Dynamics of 
Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 95 (2004) (detailing 
the provisions of the result of the negotiations); Wilfred J. Ethier, Intellectual 
Property Rights and Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization, 7 J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 449, 454 (2004) (noting that countries agreed to protection of intellectual 
property rights for trade concessions); Laurence R. Helfer, Mediating Interactions in 
an Expanding International Intellectual Property Regime 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 
123 (2004) (discussing the “successful effort by the United States and European 
Communities” to shift the intellectual property regime); Laurence R. Helfer, Regime 
Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual 
Property Lawmaking 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 20–21 (2004) (stating why the United 
States and the European Community pushed for GATT); David W. Leebron, 
Linkages, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 5, 12–13 (2002) (discussing the issue of strategic 
negotiation of trade agreements); Alan O. Sykes, TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, 
Developing Countries and the Doha “Solution” 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 47, 59 (2002) 
(“[D]eveloping countries accepted the commitments of TRIPS because it was in their 
mutual interest when coupled with the concessions that they received on other 
issues.”). 
 5. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 
1C, 108 Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS]. Although the World 
Intellectual Property Organization-administered Paris and Berne Conventions 
contemplated dispute settlement recourse to the International Court of Justice, such 
recourse required the consent of both parties and was never utilized. One 
commentator states: “The previously unenforceable Paris Convention was suddenly 
given vitality because TRIPS incorporates by reference the key elements of the Paris 
Convention.” Harold C. Wegner, Injunctive Relief: A Charming Betsy Boomerang, 4 
NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 156, 170 (2006). 
 6. Dencho Georgiev & Kim Van der Borght, Introduction, in REFORM AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 11, 11 (Georgiev & Van 
der Borght eds., 2006); James Bacchus, Appellators: The Quest for the Meaning of 
And/Or, 4 WORLD TRADE REV. 499, 501–03 (2005). For a discussion concerning the 
strength of WTO dispute settlement, see generally THOMAS ZIMMERMANN, 
NEGOTIATING THE REVIEW OF THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDERSTANDING 59 
(2006); Judith Goldstein et al., Introduction: Legalization and World Politics, 54 
INT’L ORG. 385, 389 (2000); Petersmann, supra note 3, at 33–36; Arie Reich, From 
Diplomacy to Law: The Juridicization of International Trade Relations, 17 NW. J. 
INT’L L. & BUS. 775, 777 (1996–1997). 
 7. Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT’L ORG. 401, 
404, 406 (2000) (describing the WTO dispute settlement system with regard to the 
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package deal” of agreements that make up the WTO.8 
As with any diplomatic agreement, the WTO Agreements 
are the result of compromise. It is therefore unsurprising that 
divergent interests and “textual and operational flaws” remain.9 
It should also not be surprising that the texts of international 
agreements are purposely left ambiguous by the drafters. 
Textual ambiguity allows the parties to reach agreement and 
conclude negotiations without abandoning or compromising 
their positions.10 It thus falls upon the DSB to elucidate the 
meaning of provisions when a dispute arises. Such 
interpretative power, in an era when the political wing 
consistently fails to reach consensus and govern, provides the 
DSB with a form of quasi-lawmaking power.11 Although an 
adopted report of a WTO panel or the Appellate Body 
technically only binds the parties to the dispute, it is 
abundantly clear that reports of the DSB have immense 
influence on the actions of the entire membership and the 
subsequent decisions of WTO panels.12 
 
concept of legalization); Scott Lucyk, Patents, Politics and Public Health: Access to 
Essential Medicines Under the TRIPS Agreement, 38 OTTAWA L. REV. 191, 195 
(2006–2007) (noting that the TRIPS agreement is a “shift from ‘soft’ to ‘hard’ law”). 
 8. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Constitutionalism and International 
Organizations, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 398, 442 (1996–1997) (highlighting the 
impact of the “global package deal” where parties, in one single stroke, accept 
obligations in multiple sectors). The diversity of subject matter that comes with this 
“global package deal” is particularly interesting in dispute settlement where the 
mechanisms are now applicable to previously compartmentalized areas of 
international cooperation, such as GATS and TRIPS. See id. 
 9. Bryan C. Mercurio, TRIPS, Patents, and Access to Life-Saving Drugs in the 
Developing World, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 211, 218 (2004). 
 10. See CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND POLICY OPTIONS 50 (2000) 
(“WTO Member countries still have the option, within certain limits, of defining the 
scope of patentability in quite a broad way . . . .”). 
 11. See Michael Lennard, Navigating by the Stars: Interpreting the WTO 
Agreements, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 17, 75 (2002) (discussing the elasticity that has 
arisen from the ambiguity of the language of the WTO Agreements); Richard H 
Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and 
Political Constraints, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 247, 258–59 (2004) (discussing the position 
that the DSU should be allowed to “fill gaps and clarify ambiguities in almost all 
circumstances”). For a discussion of the failure of the Doha Round of trade 
negotiations, see Bryan Mercurio, The WTO and Its Institutional Impediments, 8 
MELB. J. INT’L L. 198, 200–06 (2008); Simon J. Evenett, Reciprocity and the Doha 
Round Impasse: Lessons for the Near-Term and After, CENTRE FOR ECON. POL’Y RES., 
Sept. 3, 2007, http://www.cepr.org/pubs/PolicyInsights/PI.asp. 
 12. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States—Final Anti-Dumping 
Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico, ¶¶ 158, 160, WT/DS344/AB/R (Apr. 30, 
2008) (“It is well settled that Appellate Body reports are not binding, except with 
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This Article explores the treaty interpretation principles 
that have guided, and will presumably continue to guide, the 
decision-making of the WTO DSB. To give this analysis the 
benefit of a practical and significant context, this Article focuses 
on determining the legality of “local working requirements” 
under the TRIPS Agreement. While this issue is highly 
politicized and often couched in emotive arguments, it is our 
belief that a resolution will best be achieved through the 
adjudicative legal analysis of the WTO DSB. At the very least, 
given the complete failure of the political wing of the WTO to 
effectively resolve the dispute through legislation,13 recourse to 
the DSU is the most effective available forum to seek resolution 
 
respect to resolving the particular dispute between the parties. This, however, does 
not mean that subsequent panels are free to disregard the legal interpretations and 
the ratio decidendi contained in previous Appellate Body reports that have been 
adopted by the DSB. . . . Dispute settlement practice demonstrates that WTO 
Members attach significance to reasoning provided in previous panel and Appellate 
Body reports. Adopted panel and Appellate Body reports are often cited by parties in 
support of legal arguments in dispute settlement proceedings, and are relied upon 
by panels and the Appellate Body in subsequent disputes. In addition, when 
enacting or modifying laws and national regulations pertaining to international 
trade matters, WTO members take into account the legal interpretation of the 
covered agreements developed in adopted panel and Appellate Body reports. Thus, 
the legal interpretation embodied in adopted panel and Appellate Body reports 
becomes part and parcel of the acquis of the WTO dispute settlement system. 
Ensuring security and predictability in the dispute settlement system, as 
contemplated in Article 3.2 of the DSU, implies that, absent cogent reasons, an 
adjudicatory body will resolve the same legal question in the same way in a 
subsequent case.”). See also Appellate Body Report, United States—Import 
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products: Recourse to Article 21.5 of the 
DSU by Malaysia, ¶¶ 108–09, WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001); Appellate Body 
Report, Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II, 14, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, 
WT/DS11/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996). There is also a growing body of academic literature 
suggesting that, at the very least, a de facto system of precedent has become an 
integral part of WTO jurisprudence and perhaps even a source of law in itself. For a 
three part examination of this issue, see Raj Bhala, The Myth About Stare Decisis 
and International Trade Law, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 845, 936–41 (1999); Raj Bhala, 
The Precedent Setters: De Facto Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication, 9 FLA. ST. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 141–46 (1999); Raj Bhala, The Power of the Past: Towards 
De Jure Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication, 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 873, 957–
67 (2001); see also Anne Scully-Hill & Hans Mahncke, The Emergence of the Doctrine 
of Stare Decisis in the World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement System, 36 
LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION 133, 141–45 (2009). 
 13. Although we do see encouraging signs of political will in the Doha Round, 
there are two examples of consensus and progress among members. See Council for 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Implementation of Paragraph 
6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, IP/C/W/405 
(Aug. 28, 2003); World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 
2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/2 (Nov. 14, 2001) [hereinafter Doha Declaration]. 
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on a question of legality. 
To that extent, the object of our study is similar to that 
articulated by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., in his famous 
paper The Path of the Law: 
People want to know under what circumstances and how far they will 
run the risk of coming against what is so much stronger than 
themselves, and hence it becomes a business to find out when this 
danger is to be feared. The object of our study, then, is prediction, the 
prediction of the incidence of the public force through the 
instrumentality of the courts.14 
This analysis differs considerably from the existing 
literature, which mainly consists of normative, public policy 
perspectives on the issue.15 In contrast, this Article is a 
technical analysis which evaluates and resolves a legal conflict 
using all available sources of law. Following a brief introduction 
to the technicalities of local working requirements in 
international intellectual property law, this Article discusses 
whether this legal ambiguity can be characterized as a conflict 
of norms in international trade law. This Article does not 
consider the exceptions to rights conferred (Article 30) or 
compulsory licensing provisions of TRIPS (Article 31) to be the 
platform on which a debate regarding local working 
requirements should be conducted. Instead, the question is 
whether the two seemingly conflicting treaty provisions in the 
TRIPS Agreement are reconcilable. Their reconciliation is the 
 
 14. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES JR., COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167 (1920), 
quoted in HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 166 (Anders Wedberg 
trans., 2007) (1945). 
 15. Accordingly, this article will not rehash the well-documented desperation of 
developing countries struggling to gain access to essential medicines or the possible 
impact of intellectual property rights in that regard. Those issues have been 
thoroughly discussed elsewhere. See generally Jonathan Michael Berger, Tripping 
over Patents: AIDS, Access to Treatment and the Manufacturing of Scarcity, 17 
CONN. J. INT’L L. 157, 158–62 (2002) (discussing the struggle for access to medicine 
within the context of South Africa); David P. Fidler, Neither Science nor Shamans: 
Globalization of Markets and Health in the Developing World, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL 
LEGAL STUD. 191, 194–96 (1999) (discussing the disparity in health conditions 
between wealthy and poor nations); Zita Lazzarini, Making Access to 
Pharmaceuticals a Reality: Legal Options Under TRIPS and the Case of Brazil, 6 
YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 103, 104–07 (2003) (discussing the impact of a lack of 
access to health care in developing countries); Mercurio, supra note 9, at 225–28 
(describing the effect of the Doha Declaration on patent protection in developing 
countries); Charles T. Collins-Chase, Comment, The Case Against TRIPS-Plus 
Protection in Developing Countries Facing AIDS Epidemics, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 763, 
766–69 (2008) (describing the access problems related to antiretroviral HIV/AIDS 
drugs in developing countries). 
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basis for the legality of local working requirements. The Article 
then introduces the tools of treaty interpretation necessary to 
resolve the conflict, before considering the effect of the Doha 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (Doha 
Declaration)16 on this issue. Finally, we provide legal analysis to 
determine the legality of local working requirements under the 
TRIPS Agreement. This Article is therefore intended to be an 
exploration of treaty interpretation in WTO dispute settlement 
with the aim of determining the legality of local working 
requirements under the TRIPS Agreement. 
II. LOCAL WORKING REQUIREMENTS 
The traditional view of intellectual property rights is “as 
instruments of public policy which confer economic privileges on 
individuals solely for the purpose of contributing to the greater 
public good. The privilege is therefore a means to an end, and 
not an end in itself.”17 This privilege—in the form of a limited 
period monopoly right to exploit the creation—must then come 
with certain restrictions to ensure that the public interest is 
adequately protected.18 Local working requirements came about 
as a balancing mechanism between a monopoly right and its 
impact on the public interest. 
Local working requirements require the patent holder to 
manufacture the patented product or apply the patented process 
(i.e., “work” the patent) within the country granting the patent 
rights in order to maintain its exclusive exploitive rights.19 
Under the Paris Convention, a failure to work the patent is 
deemed an abuse of the exclusive rights attached to the patent 
and allows the government of the patent granting country to 
issue a compulsory license for the patent to a local producer.20 
 
 16. Doha Declaration, supra note 13, ¶ 5. 
 17. COMM’N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, DEP’T OF INT’L DEV., 
INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 6 (2003), quoted 
in Hans Morten Haugen, Intellectual Property—Rights or Privileges?, 8 J. WORLD 
INTELL. PROP. 445, 445 (2005). 
 18. See generally KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMY 36–65 (2000) (discussing the forms and limitations placed upon 
various forms of intellectual property). 
 19. G.H.C. BODENHAUSEN, GUIDE TO THE APPLICATION OF THE PARIS 
CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 71 (1968). 
 20. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 5, ¶ A(2), 
Mar. 20, 1883, revised July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter 
Paris Convention] (“Each country of the Union shall have the right to take 
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Thus, while the patent remains the property of the abusive 
patent holder, the owner no longer has the exclusive right to 
exploit the patent.21 Article 5 does, however, place limitations on 
the granting of a compulsory license. For example, the patent 
holder must have sufficient time to work the patent (defined in 
Article 5(A)(4) as a period of four years from the date of filing of 
the patent application or three years from the date of the grant 
of the patent, whichever period expires last), and a compulsory 
license will not be issued if the patent holder has legitimate 
reasons for not working the patent.22 
The 1886 Rome Conference of the Paris Convention left the 
parameters of adequately working a patent—then referred to by 
the official French term exploiter—undefined. Thus, each 
country had the ability to tailor its laws to match its policies and 
needs. Bodenhausen states the prevailing view of the 1967 
revision to the Paris Convention: 
The member states are also free to define what they understand by 
“failure to work”. Normally, working a patent will be understood to 
mean working it industrially, namely, by manufacture of the patented 
product, or industrial application of a patented process. Thus, 
importation or sale of the patented article, or of the article 
manufactured by a patented process, will not normally be regarding as 
“working” the patent.23 
The use of the word “abuse” for non-working patent holders 
 
legislative measures providing for the grant of compulsory licenses to prevent the 
abuses which might result from the exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by the 
patent, for example, failure to work.”). 
 21. However, the Paris Convention also provides that forfeiture can be an 
option where “the grant of compulsory licenses would not . . . [be] sufficient to 
prevent the said abuses.” See id. art. 5, ¶ A(3). Compulsory licenses were introduced 
relatively recently in the long history of local working requirements. In fact, when 
the Paris Convention was first negotiated and drafted, forfeiture of the patent was 
the only consequence for failing to work a patent. This drastic 19th century remedy 
was moderated with the introduction of compulsory licenses to address abuse of 
patents in the 1925 Hague Revision of the Paris Convention. See Paul Champ & 
Amir Attaran, Patent Rights and Local Working Under the WTO TRIPS Agreement: 
An Analysis of the U.S.-Brazil Patent Dispute, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 365, 371 (2002); 
Wegner, supra note 5, at 160. 
 22. Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement adds to the Paris Convention by 
requiring the provision of adequate remuneration to the patent holder in instances 
where a compulsory license is granted over the patent. See Ellen ‘t Hoen, TRIPS, 
Pharmaceutical Patents, and Access to Essential Medicines: A Long Way from Seattle 
to Doha, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 27, 33–34 (2002); Jennifer Bjornberg, Note, Brazil’s Recent 
Threat on Abbott’s Patent: Resolution or Retaliation?, 27 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 199, 
203 (2006) (discussing the compulsory licensing requirements of Article 31). 
 23. BODENHAUSEN, supra note 19, at 71.  
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hints at the traditional and economic significance attached to 
this concept. As one commentator summarizes: 
[The local working requirement] has the effect of forcing foreign 
patentees to situate production facilities within the patent granting 
country. Such transfers of technology are desirable from the patent 
granting country’s point of view because they contribute to a variety of 
public policy goals such as employment creation, industrial and 
technological capacity building, national balance of payments, and 
economic independence.24 
Although not a contentious point, we note for posterity that 
by reading the term “local” into working requirements we are 
not proceeding based on an unfounded assumption. The 
importance of technology transfer as a rationale for working 
requirements25 necessitates working the patent locally. 
Furthermore, the prevailing view, as articulated by 
Bodenhausen above, allows state parties to determine the 
burden that a working requirement places; however, that view 
specifically excludes importation as a means of satisfying that 
burden. In light of this, it is very difficult for us to envisage a 
persuasive argument that working requirements are offended 
by the term “local.” 
In fact, contention regarding local working requirements 
generally only became an issue after the creation of the TRIPS 
Agreement. Until that point, local working requirements had 
been part of international intellectual property law for well over 
a century, but were rarely discussed. Not only did the TRIPS 
Agreement call into question the legality of these 
requirements,26 it did so at a time when issues of public health 
 
 24. Michael Halewood, Regulating Patent Holders: Local Working 
Requirements and Compulsory Licenses at International Law, 35 OSGOODE HALL 
L.J. 243, 246 (1997). 
 25. See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
HANDBOOK: POLICY, LAW AND USE, ¶ 5.46 (2d ed. 2004), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/about-ip/en/iprm/pdf/ch5.pdf (“The main 
argument for enforcing working of the invention in a particular country is the 
consideration that, in order to promote the industrialization of the country, patents 
for invention should not be used merely to block the working of the invention in the 
country or to monopolize importation of the patented article by the patent owner. 
They should rather be used to introduce the use of the new technology into the 
country.”); see also INTRODUCTION TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 146 (World Intellectual Prop. Org. ed., 1997) (“The principal goal of 
requiring local working of a patented invention is the transfer of technology, the 
actual working of patented inventions in a given country being seen as the most 
efficient way of accomplishing such a transfer to that country.”). 
 26. Unfortunately, most commentators and even Gervais’s acclaimed treatise 
on TRIPS virtually ignore the negotiating and drafting history of this issue. See, e.g., 
 284 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW [Vol. 19:2 
 
and access to medicines gained worldwide attention. Thus, at 
almost the exact moment public health activists began to 
recommend the use of local working requirements as a tool to 
increase access to medicines in the developing world, the 
legality of such measures were, for the first time, being 
questioned.27 Local working requirements are highly relevant to 
public health because the governments of developing countries 
could potentially intervene if the patent holder refuses to work 
the patent locally and allow generic production of essential 
pharmaceuticals and/or importation in instances of scarcity or 
prohibitively priced pharmaceuticals. 
As noted in the introduction, this Article will not delve into 
the issue of whether the link between intellectual property and 
international trade law impeded developing country access to 
pharmaceuticals or even whether local working requirements 
should, for public policy reasons, be deemed TRIPS compliant.28 
This study is more contained: we simply provide legal analysis 
on the issue of whether local working requirements as they 
relate to local production are compliant with the TRIPS 
Agreement.29 
This issue was the subject of a WTO complaint in 2001 
when the United States filed a complaint against Brazil for 
enforcing local working requirements in its national laws.30 The 
two countries reached a mutually agreeable solution to the 
dispute, which left the question of the legality of local working 
 
Gervais, supra note 1, at 222. Others curtly dismiss the possibility that Article 27 of 
the TRIPS Agreement impacts upon working requirements. See, e.g., THIAMANGA 
KONGOLO, UNSETTLED INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTURAL PROPERTY ISSUES 6 (2008) 
(“[U]nder TRIPS, ‘working’ has an extensive meaning to include the import of 
patented products.”). 
 27. Sol Picciotto, Private Rights vs. Public Interests in the TRIPS Agreement: 
The Access to Medicines Dispute, 97 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC 167, 169 (2003). 
 28. See generally supra text accompanying note 15. 
 29. The scope of this article is therefore limited to non-local working as per 
local production as opposed to non-working of a patent as such. The issue is not 
merely academic, and the likelihood of ultimate resolution by the DSB remains high. 
Correa states: “The interpretation of this clause is debatable. Though Article 27.1 
has been understood as prohibiting any obligation to execute a patented invention 
locally, this interpretation is not unanimous. . . . The interpretation of this Article is 
likely to be finally settled under WTO procedures.” Carlos M. Correa, Pro-
competitive Measures Under TRIPS to Promote Technology Diffusion in Developing 
Countries, in GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 49 (Peter Drahos & Ruth 
Mayne eds., 2002). 
 30. Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, Brazil—
Measures Affecting Patent Protection, WT/DS199/3 (Jan. 9, 2001). 
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requirements unanswered.31 In addition, it left developing 
countries and generic pharmaceutical manufacturers in a 
perpetual state of uneasiness about whether taking advantage 
of legally uncertain options to provide greater access to essential 
medicines will eventually be challenged.32 
Before discussing the United States’ complaint against 
Brazil regarding the legality of local working requirements, we 
introduce the legal framework of the dispute. 
III. THE PROBLEM 
A. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK—MEET THE PLAYERS 
As outlined above, Article 5(A)(2) of the Paris Convention 
explicitly grants a right allowing the use of local working 
requirements: 
Each country of the Union shall have the right to take legislative 
measures providing for the grant of compulsory licenses to prevent the 
abuses which might result from the exercise of the exclusive rights 
conferred by the patent, for example, failure to work. 
Article 5(A)(2) of the Paris Convention is therefore the 
starting point in outlining the legal provisions that frame any 
discussion on the legality of working requirements. Article 
5(A)(2) remains relevant to the issue as Article 2 of TRIPS 
imports the obligations that bind members under the Paris 
Convention.33 In particular, Article 2.2 of TRIPS imposes the 
 
 31. Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, Brazil—Measures Affecting 
Patent Protection, WT/DS199/4, G/L/454, IP/D/23/Add.1 (July 19, 2001). 
 32. See Naomi A. Bass, Implications of the TRIPS Agreement for Developing 
Countries: Pharmaceutical Patent Laws in Brazil and South Africa in the 21st 
Century, 34 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 191, 212 (2002) (“Despite the AIDS epidemic 
in South Africa, the country has neither characterized the health crisis as a national 
emergency nor requested a compulsory license to produce generic copies of necessary 
medications to treat HIV/AIDS . . . because it feared the imposition of sanctions by 
the United States and other Western trading partners.”) (citations omitted). 
 33. Absent any articulated intention from the drafters that the incorporation of 
the WIPO treaties, such as the Paris Convention, into the WTO TRIPS Agreement is 
“a dynamic one”, we agree with the academic thought on this point and proceed on 
the basis that the WIPO treaties were incorporated as they stood at the date of the 
TRIPS Agreement in 1994. See JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: HOW WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER LAWS OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 265 (2002); see also Suzy Frankel, WTO Application of the “Customary Rules on 
Interpretation of Public International Law” to Intellectual Property, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 
365, 408 (2005–2006) (noting that TRIPS members are subject to the obligations of 
the agreements incorporated into the treaty). 
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Paris Convention provisions on TRIPS rules relating to patents: 
“Nothing in Parts I to IV of this Agreement [i.e., including Part 
II(5) – Patents] shall derogate from existing obligations that 
members may have to each other under the Paris Convention, 
the Berne Convention, the Rome Convention and the Treaty on 
Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits.”34 
The incorporation of the earlier treaties administered by the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) into the 
TRIPS Agreement demonstrates that it is meant to build upon, 
rather than replace, the earlier conventions. However, the 
incorporation of the Paris Convention is complicated by Article 
27(1) of the TRIPS Agreement, which requires members to 
ensure that, “patents shall be available and patent rights 
enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention, 
the field of technology and whether products are imported or 
locally produced.”35 
On its face, Article 27(1) appears to prohibit the use of local 
working requirements. This is the case for several reasons. 
First, it is unquestionable that local working requirements could 
detrimentally impact the patent holder’s enjoyment of patent 
rights based on the location of production. Simply stated, while 
local production of a product would satisfy the local working 
requirement, overseas production would violate it and may 
attract the imposition of a compulsory license. Second, the 
obligations in Article 27(1) are made subject to provisions such 
as Articles 65(4) and 70(8), which are not related to the 
imposition of local working requirements.36 Therefore, one could 
reasonably conclude that Article 27(1) is only subject to the 
enumerated provisions. A third possible argument against local 
working requirements can be made by reference to the 
construction of Article 2 of TRIPS, which requires that members 
shall not “derogate from existing obligations” agreed under the 
WIPO conventions.37 It could thus be argued that obligations 
differ from rights (for example, the right to impose compulsory 
licenses for the non-working) and that Article 2 merely confirms 
the continuation of obligations as opposed to rights.38 
 
 34. TRIPS, supra note 5, art. 2.2. 
 35. Id. art. 27. 
 36. Arguably, the second part of Article 27(1), which contains the 
discrimination obligation, is not even subject to the “public health exception” of 
Article 27(2). See Berger, supra note 15, at 177. 
 37. TRIPS, supra note 5, art. 2.2. 
 38. The analysis in the next section yields the answer that rights and 
 2010] TRIPS AND LOCAL WORKING REQUIREMENTS 287 
 
The three provisions covered thus far form the direct legal 
framework applicable on the question of the legality of local 
working requirements. Also of relevance are Articles 7, 8, 30, 
and 31 of the TRIPS Agreement. Articles 7 and 8, entitled 
“Objectives” and “Principles,” respectively, are relevant from a 
treaty interpretation standpoint. Article 30 is a general 
exception, which allows limited exceptions to the exclusive 
rights conferred under TRIPS. Article 31 of TRIPS regulates 
compulsory licensing by setting the conditions, including time 
periods and remuneration payable, for patent use that is not 
authorized by the patent holder. 
B. CONFLICT IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The WTO legal order, as with any legal regime, is a system 
of norms.39 In order to clarify WTO law, the relevant norms 
must be identified and the hierarchy of those norms assessed. 
The preceding section began this assessment by querying 
whether the term “right” possibly subordinates the allowance or 
right of local working requirements contained in the Paris 
Convention to the anti-discrimination obligation in the TRIPS 
Agreement. 
Pauwelyn’s contemporary contribution to the study of the 
conflict of norms separates norms into four categories: a 
command which obliges states to do something; a prohibition 
which is an obligation to not do something; a permission which 
grants a right to do something; and an exemption which grants 
a right to not do something.40 For our study, the question is 
whether the prohibition against discrimination in Article 27 of 
TRIPS is reconcilable with the permission to impose local 
working requirements in Article 2 of TRIPS (importing the Paris 
Convention). 
A narrow definition of the term “conflict” would answer this 
question in the positive. As seminally propounded by Jenks, 
under the narrow definition, a conflict only arises where a state 
party “cannot simultaneously comply with its obligations under 
both treaties.”41 If this definition for “conflict” is used to analyze 
the states’ obligations under TRIPS, then there is no conflict 
 
obligations are similarly incorporated and confirmed by Article 2 of TRIPS. 
 39. See KELSEN, supra note 14, at 123 (“The legal order is a system of norms.”). 
 40. See PAUWELYN, supra note 33, at 158. 
 41. Wilfred Jenks, Conflict of Law-making Treaties, 30 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 401, 
426 (1953) (emphasis added). 
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between provisions relevant to the legality of local working 
requirements. Article 27, as an obligation, simply trumps any 
right to impose local working requirements. The absence of an 
irreconcilable conflict42 necessitates the fulfillment of all of the 
states’ obligations under TRIPS, including Article 27. The 
matter would be closed. 
The matter remains open because in the first consideration 
of “conflict” in the context of WTO dispute settlement, the panel 
in EC—Bananas considered and rejected the avoidance of 
conflicts through the subordination of rights to obligations. The 
panel stated: 
It is true that Members could theoretically comply with [both 
provisions], simply by refraining from invoking the right. . . . However, 
such an interpretation would render whole Articles or sections of 
Agreements redundant and run counter to the object and purpose of 
many agreements listed in Annex 1A which were negotiated with the 
intent to create rights and obligations which in parts differ 
substantially from those of the GATT 1994.43 
Ultimately, the panel in EC—Bananas decided to recognize 
conflict in both situations: (i) where there are clashes between 
obligations that are mutually exclusive, so a member cannot 
comply with both obligations simultaneously; and (ii) where a 
rule in one agreement prohibits what a rule in another 
agreement explicitly permits.44 To the contrary, the second 
panel to consider the definition of conflict, Indonesia—Autos, 
opted for a narrow construction, stating that “under public 
international law a conflict exists in the narrow situation of 
mutually exclusive obligations for provisions that cover the 
same type of subject matter.”45 
 
 42. See Appellate Body Report, Argentina—Measures Affecting Imports of 
Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and Other Items, ¶ 69, WT/DS56/AB/R (Mar. 27, 1998) 
(deciding that Argentina’s inability to establish an irreconcilable conflict between 
provisions meant that nothing superseded Argentina’s obligations under GATT 
1994). 
 43. Panel Report, European Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale 
and Distribution of Bananas, ¶ 3(a)(ii), WT/DS27/R/USA (May 22, 1997). 
 44. See id. ¶ 7.159. 
 45. See Panel Report, Indonesia—Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile 
Industry, ¶ 14.49, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R (July 2, 1998); 
see also Appellate Body Report, Guatemala—Anti–Dumping Investigation Regarding 
Portland Cement From Mexico, ¶ 65, WT/DS60/AB/R (Nov. 2, 1998). The Appellate 
Body Report opined that a case of conflict only existed where provisions could not be 
read as complementing each other and that the special or additional provisions are 
to prevail. A special or additional provision should only be found to prevail over a 
provision of the DSU in a situation where adherence to the one provision will lead to 
 2010] TRIPS AND LOCAL WORKING REQUIREMENTS 289 
 
In balancing the two contradictory panel reports on the 
issue of conflict discussed above, it is noteworthy that the 
panel’s decision in Indonesia—Autos was not appealed; however, 
in EC—Bananas the panel’s decision was reviewed by the 
Appellate Body. Although the Appellate Body in EC—Bananas 
did not directly consider the panel’s unambiguous statement on 
conflict, it upheld the panel’s findings based on the recognition 
of a conflict between rights and obligations.46 
We also note that the panel in Indonesia—Autos gave its 
judgment on the existence of conflict with the proviso that, even 
if it were to accept the ruling of the panel in EC—Bananas of a 
broad definition of conflict, “there [could be] no conflict because 
the SCM Agreement does not ‘explicitly permit’ local content 
subsidies.”47 We thus seek to distinguish the panel’s findings in 
Indonesia—Autos from direct application to the question of local 
working requirements for the reason that the panel in 
Indonesia—Autos contemplates a scenario where the broader 
definition put forward in EC—Bananas might be correct in 
assuming an explicit right were to exist, as one does in Article 2 
of TRIPS.48 
It is also interesting to note that the panel in Indonesia—
Autos justified its narrow definition by the principle of 
“presumption against conflict” (discussed later in this Article). 
This presumption has subsequently been applied without 
subordinating rights to obligations and applied to specifically 
uphold rights in an incorporated WIPO treaty.49 Further, the 
Appellate Body has recognized conflict in situations that fall 
 
a violation of the other provision. The impact of this statement on the definition of 
conflict, broad or narrow, is uncertain, not least because we are dealing with an 
incorporated provision and not an additional or special one. While the idea of 
“adherence” is considered by some to limit conflict to situations where two 
obligations clash, i.e., a narrow definition of conflict; other commentators find that 
the adherence of a provision can extend to rights and obligations, and therefore this 
statement does not necessarily espouse a narrow definition of conflict. Compare 
Gabrielle Marceau, Conflict of Norms and Conflicts of Jurisdictions, 35 J. WORLD 
TRADE 1081, 1085 (2001) (stating that adherence limits the definition of conflict) 
with PAUWELYN, supra note 33, at 195 (arguing that adherence extends the 
definition of conflict). 
 46. Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Regime for the 
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, ¶ 255, WT/DS27/A,B/R (Sep. 9, 
1997). 
 47. See Panel Report, Indonesia—Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile 
Industry, ¶ 5.345, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R (July 2, 1998). 
 48. See id. ¶ 5.346. 
 49. See Panel Report, United States—Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, 
¶ 6.6, WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000); see also infra Section 4.1.3. 
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beyond the narrow scope of the panel’s definition in Indonesia—
Autos. For example, the Appellate Body in United States—FSC 
and Brazil—Aircraft accepted that conflict existed where the 
provisions in question provided different obligations that were 
not mutually exclusive (mutual exclusivity being a required 
element of conflict as per Indonesia—Autos).50 
Further support for a broader definition of “conflict” is 
found in the authoritative commentary of Sir Humphrey 
Waldock, who remarked in the preparation of Article 30 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)51 that “[t]he 
idea conveyed by the term [conflict] was that of a comparison 
between two treaties which revealed that their clauses . . .  could 
not be reconciled with one another.”52 The term clause, of 
course, encompasses clauses granting rights as well as clauses 
placing obligations. 
If conflict can exist between a right and an obligation, then 
it only follows logically that rights are on par with obligations. 
This is by no means a novel idea. For instance, preeminent 
jurist Hans Kelsen stated: 
[A] distinction is drawn between legal norms which command or 
forbid, on the one hand, and legal norms which permit, on the other: 
“Law is permissive or imperative.” But the distinction does not hold. 
The legal order gives somebody a permission, confers on somebody a 
right, only by imposing a duty upon somebody else . . . Law is 
imperative for the one, and thereby permissive for the other.53 
Interestingly, the Appellate Body in US—Section 211 
applied this formulation of rights as imposing corresponding 
obligations.54 In that dispute, the rights granted under the Paris 
Convention were characterized as obligations on other WTO 
members to confer those rights. The Appellate Body held: 
WTO Members are obliged to confer an exceptional right on an 
applicant in a Paris Union country other than its country of origin, one 
 
 50. See Appellate Body Report, United States—Tax Treatment for “Foreign 
Sales Corporations”, ¶ 117, WT/DS108/AB/R (Feb. 24, 2000); see also Appellate Body 
Report, Brazil—Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, ¶ 191, WT/DS46/AB/R 
(Aug. 2, 1999). 
 51. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331. We elaborate on the applicability of the VCLT to WTO disputes in Part IV. 
 52. Sir Humphrey Waldock, Special Rapporteur, Remarks at the 742nd 
meeting on the Law of Treaties (June, 10 1964) in 1 Y.B.Int’l L. Comm’n 125, ¶ 68 
(1966) (emphasis added). 
 53. See KELSEN, supra note 14, at 77 (emphasis added). 
 54. See Appellate Body Report, United States—Section 211 Omnibus 
Appropriations Act of 1998, ¶ 136, WT/DS176/AB/R (Jan. 2, 2002). 
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that is over and above whatever rights the other country grants to its 
own nationals in its domestic law. . . . [I]f [a] country is a Member of 
the Paris Union – and, now, of the WTO – then an applicant from 
another WTO Member who seeks registration in that country of a 
trademark duly registered in its country of origin has the additional 
rights that WTO Members are obliged to confer on that applicant under 
[the Paris Convention].55 
Thus, the rights under the Paris Convention are granted 
the status of corresponding obligations on other members. These 
rights have taken on the language of obligations, and the 
obligations owed under both the TRIPS Agreements and the 
incorporated Conventions are on equal footing. This 
interpretation was confirmed by the Arbitrators in EC—
Bananas, which explicitly held that when TRIPS incorporates 
other instruments, membership in the TRIPS Agreement does 
not excuse compliance with one instrument’s obligations at the 
expense of another.56 
The possibility of a conflicting relationship can be further 
explored through the scholarship of Pauwelyn in relation to 
conflict of norms in international law. Pauwelyn prescribes 
three requirements that must be fulfilled before two norms can 
be in conflict: overlap in the subject matter (ratione materiae); 
overlap in the state parties to which the norms apply (ratione 
personae); and the point-in-time operation of the norms (ratione 
temporis).57 
The conflict between Article 27 of TRIPS and Article 5 of 
the Paris Convention covers all three of these requirements. 
They both deal with rights enjoyable under a patent (overlap in 
subject matter) and the application of Article 2 of TRIPS makes 
their operation simultaneous in cases of non-working a patent 
(temporal overlap). The temporal overlap occurs because the 
obligation not to discriminate in TRIPS is a general obligation 
which applies continuously to regulate conduct, while the rights 
granted under the Paris Convention are individual in that they 
are triggered in the specific circumstance of abuse by non-
working.58 Thus there is a temporal overlap at the point when 
the right under the Paris Convention is triggered.  
 
 55. Id. (emphasis added). 
 56. Decision of the Arbitrators, European Communities—Regime for the 
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas: Recourse to Arbitration by the 
European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU, ¶ 149, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU 
(Mar. 24, 2000). 
 57. PAUWELYN, supra note 33, at 165. 
 58. Id. at 160. 
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Lastly, with respect to ratione personae, Article 2.1 of 
TRIPS clearly states that “[TRIPS] Members shall comply with 
Articles 1 through 12, and Article 19, of the Paris Convention.”59 
This obligatory language demands compliance with the 
incorporated parts of the Paris Convention, including Article 5, 
from all TRIPS members. Thus every member of the WTO (and 
therefore TRIPS) is bound by both legal provisions: Article 5 of 
the Paris Convention and Article 27 of TRIPS. We believe 
Article 2.1 is unequivocal in its intent that all WTO members—
whether or not they are in fact members of the Paris 
Convention—must comply with the incorporated provisions of 
the Paris Convention. Even if the weight of the language in 
Article 2.1 does not suffice, the result is likely to remain 
unchanged because, as a practical matter, the membership of 
the Paris Convention (173 contracting parties)60 largely overlaps 
with the membership of TRIPS (i.e., the WTO membership, 153 
members).61 Further there are no industrialized nations in the 
WTO that have not signed the Paris Convention,62 making it 
highly improbable that a country that is not a signatory of the 
Paris Convention, but has influential industrial interests in 
patents, will bring an action against local working 
requirements. The instigators of such a dispute would almost 
certainly be countries with significant intellectual property, and 
the TRIPS members who are not parties to the Paris Convention 
do not fit that bill. Therefore, we can safely assume that a WTO 
dispute regarding local working requirements will have the 
characteristic of ratione personae. 
Based on the analysis above, we are faced with a situation 
in which there is likely to be a conflict between the obligation 
under Article 27 of TRIPS and the rights granted by Article 5 of 
the Paris Convention (as incorporated into TRIPS by Article 
2.2). Simply stated, the action permitted by the Paris 
Convention is prohibited by TRIPS. This conclusion is subject to 
 
 59. TRIPS, supra note 5, art. 2.1 (emphasis added). 
 60. World Intellectual Prop. Org. [WIPO], Contracting Parties, 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=2 (last visited 
Jan. 23, 2010). 
 61. World Trade Org. [WTO], Members and Observers, 
http://www.wto.org/english/theWTO_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Jan. 
23, 2010). 
 62. Compare WIPO, Contracting Parties, supra note 60, with WTO, Members 
and Observers, supra note 61. Only the following WTO members are not party to the 
Paris Convention: Cape Verde, Brunei, Darussalam, Fiji, Hong Kong (China), 
Kuwait, Macao (China), Myanmar, Solomon Islands, and Chinese Taipei. 
 2010] TRIPS AND LOCAL WORKING REQUIREMENTS 293 
 
a principle of treaty interpretation—the presumption against 
conflict—which seeks to find means of interpreting the 
potentially conflicting provisions in harmony to give effect to 
each provision (discussed below in Part IV.A.3). 
It is worth noting that the question of local working 
requirements has traditionally been analyzed in terms of the 
ability of Articles 30 and 31 to provide relief from the obligations 
in Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement.63 We disagree with this 
approach and prefer to analyze it as a possible conflict between 
Article 5 of the Paris Convention and Article 27 of TRIPS. Since 
local working requirements are clearly and specifically covered 
under Article 5 of the Paris Convention, it seems logical to 
frame the discussion within the scope of the specific provision 
addressing the issue rather than the general exception in Article 
30.64 Further, Article 31 cannot be the most appropriate 
analytical tool for the purposes of determining legality of local 
working requirements because the provisions regulating the 
grant of a compulsory license become relevant only once it is 
established that the remedy of a compulsory license is allowed 
in circumstances of non-working.  
C. UNITED STATES V. BRAZIL: THE ALMOST-SHOWDOWN 
Even the shallowest exploration of the access to essential 
medicines in developing countries, or challenges to patent-
holding pharmaceutical companies, reveals high emotions at the 
grassroots level and vigorous debate on an academic and 
political level. It is therefore slightly surprising that an issue as 
significant to access to medicines as the legality of local working 
requirements remains unanswered. A WTO complaint 
addressing this issue was filed by the United States against 
Brazil, but a mutually agreed solution between the governments 
resolved the dispute. 
 
 63. See generally Champ & Attaran, supra note 21 (discussing the use of 
Articles 30 and 31 as exceptions to the obligations of Articles 27 and 28 of TRIPS); 
Kevin J. Nowak, Note, Staying Within the Negotiated Framework: Abiding by the 
Non-Discrimination Clause in TRIPS Article 27, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 899, 935–41 
(2004) (looking at the obligations Article 27 through application of Article 30); 
Bjomberg, supra note 22, at 201 (adhering to this traditional position). 
 64. See Daya Shanker, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the 
Dispute Settlement System of the WTO and the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement, 36 J. WORLD TRADE 721, 758 (2002) (arguing that working requirements 
are compatible with the TRIPS agreement through Article 2 which incorporates 
Article 5 of the Paris Convention). 
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The story begins with the slightly forced connection drawn 
between the anti-discrimination obligation contained in Article 
27 and the exceptions provisions in Article 30.65 This connection 
received notable encouragement from the decision of the WTO 
panel in Canada—Pharmaceutical Patents,66 which held that 
any compulsory license granted as an Article 30 exception to 
Article 27 must comply with the anti-discrimination 
requirement in Article 27.67 The decision was not appealed, and 
therefore the Appellate Body, which had previously supported a 
broad interpretation of exceptions, did not have occasion to 
weigh in on the issue.68 Since the debate over the legality of 
local working requirements has traditionally been framed in 
terms of the relationship between the obligation in Article 27 
and the exceptions to that obligation in Articles 30 and 31, the 
Canada—Pharmaceutical Patents decision was significant for 
the parties interested in the legality of local working 
requirements. 
Buoyed by the panel’s narrow reading of the exceptions in 
Article 30 in Canada—Pharmaceutical Patents, the United 
States challenged local working aspects of Brazilian patent 
law.69 As expected, the United States’ complaint anticipated 
 
 65. Id. 
 66. See Panel Report, Canada—Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, 
¶¶ 7.88–.93, WT/DS114/R (Mar. 17, 2000). This dispute did not concern local 
working requirements. 
 67. This aspect of the decision has been criticized in the literature. See, e.g., 
Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Diversifying Without Discriminating: 
Complying with the Mandates of the TRIPS Agreement, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & 
TECH. L. REV. 445, 448–54 (2007); Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, 
International Intellectual Property Law and the Public Domain of Science, 7 J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 431, 443 (2004) (“[T]he panel was wrong in applying Article 27.1 to 
exemptions.”). For an invective condemnation on this and other aspects of the 
decision, see Frederick M. Abbot, Bob Hudec as Chair of the Canada—Generic 
Pharmaceuticals Panel – The WTO Gets Something Right, 6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 733, 
736 (2003); Robert Howse, The Canadian Generic Medicines Panel: A Dangerous 
Precedent in Dangerous Times, 3 J. WORLD INT’L PROP. 493, 505–06 (2000) (calling 
the panel’s reasoning on this point “totally perverse” and generally criticizing the 
panel’s approach, treaty interpretation, legal interpretations, and conclusions). But 
see Nowak, supra note 63 (praising this aspect of the panel’s decision). 
 68. Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Concerning 
Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), ¶ 104, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 
16, 1998) (“[M]erely characterizing a treaty provision as an ‘exception’ does not by 
itself justify a ‘stricter’ or ‘narrower’ interpretation of that provision than would be 
warranted by examination of the ordinary meaning of the actual treaty words, 
viewed in context and in the light of the treaty’s object and purpose, or, in other 
words, by applying the normal rules of treaty interpretation.”). 
 69. The United States formally commenced the legal action in the WTO by a 
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that the legality of local working requirements would be based 
on Articles 30 and 31 while Brazil’s response relied on Article 5 
of the Paris Convention. 
Article 68 of the Brazilian Industrial Property Law, 
promulgated on May 14, 1996, in purported compliance with the 
new TRIPS regime, requires holders of Brazilian patents to 
manufacture the patented product in Brazil (a local working 
requirement). Failure to do so could result in a compulsory 
license being imposed on the patent after three years unless the 
patent holder could demonstrate that production in Brazil was 
not economically feasible or was otherwise unreasonable.70 
This impugned section of the Brazilian patent law had been 
used by the government to establish a successful anti-AIDS 
program that offered free antiretroviral medication to patients. 
The affordability of the medication was crucial to the 
continuation of the program, and the introduction of the law 
greatly contributed to a 79% drop in the price of drugs between 
1996 and 2000.71 
In a storm of anti-AIDS demonstrations, premonitions of a 
Pyrrhic victory, and the weight of a looming public-relations 
disaster, the United States negotiated a mutually agreeable 
solution with Brazil and withdrew its WTO complaint in June 
2001.72 Therefore, this perfect candidate for a legal resolution to 
 
communication dated May 30, 2000. The consultations between Brazil and the 
United States, joined by the EC, on June 29, 2000 and December 1, 2000 did not 
reach a mutually satisfactory outcome and the establishment of a panel was 
requested. Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, Brazil—
Measures Affecting Patent Protection, WT/DS199/3 (Jan. 9, 2001). 
 70. See Lei de Propriedade Industrial Brasileira [Brazilian Industrial Property 
Law], available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Leis/L9279.htm; see also ‘t 
Hoen, supra note 22, at 32.  
 71. DONALD G. RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND GLOBAL 
CAPITALISM: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 159 (2004). This 
figure, 79%, gives a fair idea of the reasons behind Brazil wanting to defend the 
section and similarly the reasons for pharmaceutical companies in the United States 
being threatened by it. 
 72. Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, Brazil—Measures Affecting 
Patent Protection, WT/DS199/4, G/L/454, IP/D/23/Add.1 (July 19, 2001). Notably, the 
Mutually Agreed Solution also included an agreement that Brazil would not launch 
dispute settlement action regarding sections 204 and 209 of the United States 
patent law; see also Bass, supra note 32, at 208 (noting that the United States 
withdrew its complaint); Champ & Attaran, supra note 21, at 381; Lazzarini, supra 
note 15, at 132; Anthony P. Valach Jr., Note, TRIPS: Protecting the Rights of Patent 
Holders and Addressing Public Health Issues in Developing Countries, 4 CHI.-KENT 
J. INTELL. PROP. 156, 175–82 (2005); Helen Cooper, U.S. Drops WTO Complaint 
Against Brazilian Patent Law, WALL ST. J. EUR., June 26, 2001, at A2. 
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the local working requirements question never reached its 
potential.73 The resolution did not shed any light on the legality 
of local working requirements and was considered more of a 
temporary laying down of arms rather than surrender. The 
nature of the agreement, which merely required Brazil to 
provide U.S. officials with advance notice prior to invoking 
Article 68 of its patent law, left such provisions open to 
challenge in the future.74 
As Raustiala notes, the resolution of problems which 
drafters leave in the “too hard” basket often falls to the political 
stratagem of deferral.75 Like the fate of the United States-Brazil 
dispute, deferral may be preferred because a solution through 
legal means bears the burden of identifiable losers and winners.  
Problematically, the lack of legal certainty leaves countries 
hesitant to take advantage of available flexibilities for fear of an 
expensive legal challenge.76 Therefore, though not immediately 
identifiable, there are still losers in this unresolved legal issue. 
IV. TREATY INTERPRETATION—LEGAL SOLUTION TO A 
LEGAL PROBLEM 
Lack of predictability in legal obligations can have the 
practical effect of eroding rights that parties negotiated into the 
WTO Agreement. Where textual ambiguity in a treaty 
engenders divergent expectations from the membership 
regarding their legal rights and obligations, dispute settlement 
 
 73. Valach, supra note 72, at 177. 
 74. See Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, Brazil—Measures Affecting 
Patent Protection, WT/DS199/4, G/L/454, IP/D/23/Add.I (July 19, 2001); see also 
Champ & Attaran, supra note 21, at 381; Valach, supra note 72, at 177.  
 75. Kal Raustiala, Density and Conflict in International Intellectual Property 
Law, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1021, 1029 (2006). 
 76. For information on the costs of litigating a WTO dispute, see Chad P. Bown, 
Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement: Complainants, Interested Parties, and 
Free Riders, 19 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 287, 287–310 (2005); Mark L. Busch & Eric 
Reinhardt, Developing Countries and General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade/World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 719, 720–
23 (2003); Gregory Shaffer, How to Make the WTO Dispute Settlement System Work 
for Developing Countries: Some Proactive Developing Country Strategies, in INT’L 
CENTRE FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV., TOWARDS A DEVELOPMENT-SUPPORTIVE 
DISPUTE SYSTEM IN THE WTO 1, 5, 16, 29–32 (Victor Mosoti ed., 2003), available at 
http://www.ictsd.org/pubs/ictsd_series/resource_papers/DSU_2003.pdf. Cf. Ruth L. 
Okediji, Public Welfare and the Role of the WTO: Reconsidering the TRIPS 
Agreement, 17 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 819 (2003) (discussing generally the difficulties 
and problems with WTO dispute resolution). 
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presents itself as perhaps the sole means of reaching a 
satisfactory solution. 
In the context of the WTO, Article 3.2 of the DSU provides 
for such interpretations: 
The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in 
providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading 
system. The Members recognize that it serves to preserve the rights 
and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to 
clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with 
customary rules of interpretation of public international law.77 
The stipulated parameter of customary rules of 
interpretation of public international law must be respected by 
panels and the Appellate Body if WTO dispute settlement is to 
deliver on this promise of providing and maintaining security 
and predictability.78 Therefore the discipline of legal 
interpretation—as distinguished from judicial activism or 
judicial lawmaking—is crucial to any benefit that can be 
attributed to the WTO DSB, or any dispute settlement 
mechanism for that matter, domestic or international.79 Legal 
interpretation and decision-making based upon objectively-
based rules takes on a particularly significant role in the 
international sphere where agreements come into being after 
painstaking negotiation between the sovereign states party to 
 
 77. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 2, art. III(2), Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay 
Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter DSU]. The applicability of the DSU 
mechanism to TRIPS related disputes was confirmed in Appellate Body Report, 
India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, ¶ 
29, WT/DS50/AB/R (Dec. 19, 1997). 
 78. See generally Wolfgang Weiss, Security and Predictability Under WTO Law, 
2 WORLD TRADE REV. 183 (2003) (discussing why the WTO should respect customary 
international legal interpretation). 
 79. See YANG GUOHUA, BRYAN MERCURIO & LI YONGJIE, WTO DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT UNDERSTANDING: A DETAILED INTERPRETATION 17 n.3 (2005). The 
scope of the WTO DSB’s actions under Article 3.2 has been limited to a point where 
the interpretation or clarification does not add or diminish the rights and 
obligations provided in the covered agreements. See also Appellate Body Report, 
United States—Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from 
India, 19, WT/DS33/AB/R (Apr. 25, 1997) (“Given the explicit aim of dispute 
settlement that permeates the DSU, we do not consider that Article 3.2 of the DSU 
is meant to encourage either panels or the Appellate Body to ‘make law’ by clarifying 
existing provisions of the WTO Agreement outside the context of resolving a 
particular dispute.”); Lennard, supra note 11, at 85–89 (stating that the best 
approach for the WTO DSB is to use the textual approach of the Vienna 
Convention). 
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the dispute. In that sense, parties to an international dispute 
(i.e., nation states) are much more connected to the body of law 
governing their dispute (i.e., treaties that they themselves have 
negotiated) than most individual citizens before a domestic 
court. 
A. VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 
Articles 3180 and 3281 of the VCLT require that a treaty be 
interpreted in good faith, according to the purpose, object, and 
context of the treaty, with resort to supplementary means of 
interpretation (including negotiating history) only if the 
preliminary interpretation results in ambiguity or absurdity.82 
 
 80. Article 31 General rule of interpretation: 
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and 
in the light of its object and purpose. 
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall 
comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: 
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all 
the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty; 
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in 
connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other 
parties as an instrument related to the treaty. 
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the 
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;  
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which 
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;  
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations 
between the parties. 
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the 
parties so intended. 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 51, art. 31. 
 81. Article 32 Supplementary means of interpretation:  
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including 
the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, 
in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, 
or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 
31: (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result 
which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. 
Id. art. 32. 
 82. For this reason, while the negotiating history of local working requirements 
as they relate to local production is interesting, it does not feature as part of treaty 
interpretation as guided by Article 31 of the VCLT. Negotiating history would only 
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In US—Reformulated Gasoline, the first report of the newly 
established WTO Appellate Body, the Appellate Body made a 
timely proclamation that, for the purposes of the interpretation 
of WTO Agreements: “[Article 31 of the VCLT] has attained the 
status of a rule of customary or general international law.”83 Not 
long after inducting Article 31 into the interpretation tool-kit, 
the Appellate Body in Japan—Alcohol announced that “[Article 
32 of the VCLT], dealing with the role of supplementary means 
of interpretation, [has] also attained the same status [of 
customary or general international law].”84 
Thus, the Appellate Body has appointed another 
international agreement, the VCLT, to play the part of the 
“customary rules of interpretation of public international law” 
that guide their decisions.85 In doing so, the Appellate Body has 
sought to ensure that the WTO’s treaty interpreters remain 
subject to “certain common disciplines [imposed] upon treaty 
interpreters, irrespective of the content of the treaty provision 
being examined and irrespective of the field of international law 
concerned.”86 
In irony we note that behind an appearance of simplicity,87 
these articles raise several questions in their interpretive 
guidance. How is an interpreter to be sure that they have 
satisfied the requirement of interpretation in good faith? Would 
a reading of the TRIPS Agreement that read down the 
obligation contained in Article 27 in light of the right to local 
working right in Article 5 of the Paris Convention (incorporated 
in TRIPS) be in good faith? Is the ordinary meaning of a term its 
dictionary meaning? What exact role does the context play in 
 
become relevant under Article 32 of the VCLT if the interpretation according to 
Article 31 “leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or leads to a result which is 
manifestly absurd or unreasonable.” Id. Certain criticisms of the Canada—
Pharmaceutical Patents decision focus on panel’s misapplication of Article 31 of the 
VCLT in the context of Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement in resorting to 
negotiating history over the obligatory interpretive sources under Article 31 of the 
VCLT. See Howse, supra note 67. 
 83. Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline, 15, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996). 
 84. Appellate Body Report, Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 9, 
WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996). 
 85. For recent affirmations, see Appellate Body Report, United States—
Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing Methodology, ¶ 267, 
WT/DS350/AB/R (Feb. 4, 2009); Bacchus, supra note 6, at 504–05. 
 86. Appellate Body Report, United States—Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain 
Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan, ¶ 60, WT/DS184/AB/R (July 24, 2001). 
 87. Frankel, supra note 33, at 386.  
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the interpretation of a provision? Does the interpretation have 
to be in compliance with the object and purpose provisions of the 
treaty in order to be valid under the VCLT? 
Before working through these issues, it may be useful to 
identify the elements of the VCLT that are relevant in the 
context of local working requirements. We noted in Part III.A 
that Articles 2 (incorporating Article 5 of the Paris Convention), 
27, 30, and 31 of the TRIPS Agreement are the main provisions 
at issue. In addition, Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement 
provide the object and purpose of the Agreement.88 The 
Preamble is also relevant, as it forms part of the “context” of a 
treaty provision as an element mentioned in VCLT Article 
31(2).89 
Lastly, the Doha Declaration is relevant as an “instrument 
which was made by one or more parties in connection with the 
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an 
instrument related to the treaty.”90 
A Textual Interpretation 
For some time, the exact role of elements such as the 
context and object and purpose of agreements, which take us 
beyond the actual textual language of a provision, was not 
immediately clear to the GATT/WTO legal community. We know 
from the VCLT that these elements are relevant, but are they 
determinative, and if not, then to what extent are they 
influential? This question formed the crux of the debate 
surrounding the conclusion of the VCLT in 1969. 
When the mode of interpretation of treaties was enveloped 
in doctrinal controversy at the 1968 Vienna Conference, 
attendees considered three main approaches.91 The first used 
the text of the relevant provisions as a mere starting point, and 
sought to determine the appropriate interpretation based on the 
intentions of the parties. The second was a textual method 
where an investigation into the intent of the parties at the time 
of drafting was only relevant to the extent that it was captured 
 
 88. In addition to purpose, Mitchell and Voon suggested that Articles 7 and 8 
could also serve as context in interpreting other TRIPS provisions. See Andrew D. 
Mitchell & Tania Voon, Patents and Public Health in the WTO, FTAs and Beyond: 
Tension and Conflict in International Law, 43 J. WORLD TRADE 571, 573 (2009). 
 89. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 51, art. 31. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See Lennard, supra note 11, at 20. 
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by the text of an agreement. The third was the teleological 
method, which began with a broad consideration of the treaty’s 
object and purpose and then interpreted the relevant provisions 
in a manner that was best suited to the fulfillment of the object 
and purpose.92 
It is now beyond doubt that treaty interpretation under the 
VCLT must follow the textual approach, as confirmed by the 
WTO Appellate Body and the International Law Commission.93 
Therefore, dispute settlement proceeds on the basis that the 
intentions and expectations of the parties appear in the text of 
the agreement94 and adjudicators are not at liberty to read into 
the text any intention that is not apparent from the text of the 
relevant provision. In the words of former chairman of the 
Appellate Body James Bacchus, “the ‘deal’ is in the words of the 
treaty.”95 
This choice of the textual or predominantly literal approach 
has been justified by reference to the security and predictability 
that it offers.96 However, the task of the treaty interpreter is 
 
 92. See id. at 20 n.90. See also Summary Records of the 876th Meeting, [1966] 1 
Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 219, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966; IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA 
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 130–35 (2d ed. 1984); Gerald Fitzmaurice, 
The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: Treaty Interpretation 
and Certain Other Treaty Points, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1 (1951); Francis G. Jacobs, 
Varieties of Approach to Treaty Interpretation: With Special Reference to the Draft 
Convention on the Law of the Treaties before the Vienna Diplomatic Conference, 18 
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 318, 319–25 (1969) (laying out the three different approaches to 
treaty interpretation). 
 93. See Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II, 17, WT/DS8/AB/R, 
WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996) (“[T]he words actually used in the 
Article provide the basis for an interpretation that must give meaning and effect to 
all its terms. The proper interpretation of the Article is, first of all, a textual 
interpretation.”); Summary Records of the 876th Meeting, supra note 92. For 
comments by participants in the Vienna Convention, see Sir Humphrey Waldock, 
Third Report on the Law of the Treaties, [1964] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 5, 56, U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.4/167; SINCLAIR, supra note 92, at 115. 
 94. See Appellate Body Report, India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical 
and Agricultural Chemical Products, ¶¶ 43–45, WT/DS50/AB/R (Dec. 19, 1997). 
 95. Bacchus, supra note 6, at 512. 
 96. See Jacques Werner, The TRIPS Agreement Under the Scrutiny of the WTO 
Dispute Settlement System: The Case of Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and 
Agricultural Chemical Products in India, 1 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 309, 319 (1998) 
(“Any extension of the TRIPS’ textual obligations through interpretation might 
cause these countries to consider that the delicate, negotiated equilibrium which 
they had achieved in the WTO Agreement is being altered in favour of the developed 
countries, which of course might alter their goodwill in honouring their obligations. 
The Appellate Body’s determination not to allow any alteration of the negotiated 
equilibrium of the TRIPS Agreement transpires throughout its opinion.”); see also 
Olivier Cattaneo, The Interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement: Considerations for the 
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complicated by the fact that influences of the teleological 
approach remain in Article 31 of the VCLT. Supported by 
eminent international law figures such as Sir Henry 
Lauterpacht, the teleological approach to interpretation appears 
in the VCLT requirement that a good faith interpretation of a 
treaty can only occur in “light of its object and purpose.”97 
Initially the Appellate Body struggled to reconcile this 
teleological trait with its textual interpretation agenda, and 
resorted to addressing the elements required by Article 31 of the 
VCLT in a hierarchical manner.98  
A treaty interpreter must begin with, and focus upon, the text of the 
particular provision to be interpreted. It is in the words constituting 
that provision, read in their context, that the object and the purpose of 
the states parties to the treaty must first be sought. Where the 
meaning imparted by text itself is equivocal or inconclusive, or where 
confirmation of the correctness of the reading of the text itself is 
desired, light from the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole may 
usefully be sought.99 
Thus in this early case, the Appellate Body introduced a 
kind of sequencing for the contextual aspects of Article 31 of the 
VCLT that resembled the use of supplementary materials in 
Article 32 of the VCLT.100 Under this approach the use of object 
and purpose would be reserved for situations where the text was 
equivocal. Shanker notes, and we agree, that absent any words 
in Article 31 of the VCLT requiring this type of hierarchy 
between elements of interpretation, there is no reason for such 
dilution of the role of the object and purpose of a treaty.101 The 
 
WTO Panel and Appellate Body, 3 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 627, 657–58 (2000); 
Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Six Years on the Bench of the “World Trade Court:” Some 
Personal Experiences as Member of the Appellate Body of the World Trade 
Organization, 36 J. WORLD TRADE 605, 616 (2002).  
 97. See Lennard, supra note 11, at 21 n.12; see also Jacobs, supra note 92, at 
320 n.3. 
 98. See Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Customs 
Classification of Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts, WT/DS269/AB/R, WT/DS286/AB/R 
(Sept. 12, 2005); Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the 
Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 
2005); Federico Ortino, Treaty Interpretation and the WTO Appellate Body Report in 
US—Gambling: A Critique, 9 J. INT’L ECON. L. 117, 120 (2006) (discussing the 
friction between the textual and holistic approaches).  
 99. Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶ 114, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) (emphasis 
added). 
 100. See Shanker, supra note 64, at 726. 
 101. Id. See also Ehlermann, supra note 96, at 615–16 (“According to Article 
31.1 of the Vienna Convention, ‘a Treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in 
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Appellate Body in US—Zeroing recently agreed with this 
reasoning and endorsed a holistic and integrated approach to 
the interpretive elements in Article 31 of the VCLT. It is worth 
setting out in full the Appellate Body’s unambiguous 
pronouncement in US—Zeroing, as it clearly answers questions 
that would otherwise require discussion: 
The principles of interpretation that are set out in Articles 31 and 32 
are to be followed in a holistic fashion. The interpretative exercise is 
engaged so as to yield an interpretation that is harmonious and 
coherent and fits comfortably in the treaty as a whole so as to render 
the treaty provision legally effective. . . . [A] treaty interpreter is 
required to have recourse to context and object and purpose to elucidate 
the relevant meaning of the word or term. . . . This logical progression 
provides a framework for proper interpretative analysis . . . . At the 
same time, it should be kept in mind that treaty interpretation is an 
integrated operation, where interpretative rules or principles must be 
understood and applied as connected and mutually reinforcing 
components of a holistic exercise. . . . [R]ules and principles of the 
Vienna Convention cannot contemplate interpretations with mutually 
contradictory results. Instead, the enterprise of interpretation is 
intended to ascertain the proper meaning of a provision; one that fits 
harmoniously with the terms, context, and object and purpose of the 
treaty. The purpose of such an exercise is therefore to narrow the range 
of interpretations, not to generate conflicting, competing 
interpretations. Interpretative tools cannot be applied selectively or in 
isolation from one another. It would be a subversion of the 
interpretative disciplines of the Vienna Convention if application of 
those disciplines yielded contradiction instead of coherence and 
harmony among, and effect to, all relevant treaty provisions.102  
Although the desire to adopt a holistic approach under the 
VCLT is not novel, the above-extracted decision of the Appellate 
Body clarifies the exact objective of the enterprise of 
interpretation: one interpretation which is at harmony with the 
entire treaty. This can be reconciled with the victory of 
 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their 
context and in the light of its object and purpose’. Among these three criteria, the 
Appellate Body has certainly attached the greatest weight to the first, i.e., ‘the 
ordinary meaning of the terms of the treaty’. This is easily illustrated by the 
frequent references in Appellate Body reports to dictionaries, in particular to the 
Shorter Oxford Dictionary, which, in the words of certain critical observers, has 
become “one of the covered agreements”. The second criterion, i.e., “context” has less 
weight than the first, but is certainly more often used and relied upon than the 
third, i.e., ‘object and purpose’ . . . the Appellate Body clearly privileges ‘literal’ 
interpretation . . . .”). 
 102. Appellate Body Report, United States—Continued Existence and 
Application of Zeroing Methodology, ¶¶ 268–73, WT/DS350/AB/R (Feb. 4, 2009) 
(emphasis added). 
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textualism over teleological interpretation because the common 
intention of parties is still sought from the text of the treaty—
not predominantly sought from the object and purpose clause 
(as would be the teleological approach), nor just the single 
clause of the relevant provision (strict textualism), but rather an 
interpretation that integrates all of the contextual elements set 
out in VCLT Article 31. 
Even though our analysis below deals with each of the 
interpretive elements of the VCLT (good faith, ordinary 
meaning, context, and object and purpose) separately, we 
acknowledge that the Appellate Body has moved away from 
treating the various interpretive elements as a “sequence of 
separate tests to be applied in a hierarchical order,”103 and now 
seeks a conclusion that boasts harmony with all requisite 
elements. 
1. Ordinary Meaning of Words in their Context 
The legality of local working requirements is probably not 
going to turn on the pure meaning attributed to the words in the 
relevant provisions of TRIPS or the Paris Convention. This is 
unlike disputes such as US—Gambling, where a key issue 
before the Appellate Body was whether the ordinary meaning of 
“sporting” included gambling, or EC—Chicken Cuts, where the 
meaning given to the word “salted” was relevant.104 On the 
other hand, the context which informs the ordinary meaning of 
the words is bound to be of interest. We make these statements 
based on the nature of the complaint by the United States in the 
request for consultations with Brazil discussed in Part III.C 
above. The political resolution may have deprived us of a legal 
solution, but the instigation of the complaint did reveal the 
parameters of the problem. 
For the sake of completeness we nevertheless “start the 
interpretation from the ordinary meaning of the ‘raw’ text of the 
relevant treaty provision [Article 27 of TRIPS], and then seek to 
construe it in its context and in the light of the treaty’s object 
 
 103. Panel Report, United States—Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974, ¶ 
7.22, WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999). 
 104. Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Customs Classification of 
Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts, ¶ 170, WT/DS269/AB/R, WT/DS286/AB/R (Sept. 12, 
2005); Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border 
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ 163, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005). 
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and purpose.”105 Article 27, which promises to be the focus of 
any complaint against local working requirements, states that 
“patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without 
discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of 
technology and whether products are imported or locally 
produced.”106 
The term discrimination is of interest, as it encapsulates 
the essence of the obligation in question. A dictionary meaning 
can really only serve as a starting point because the Appellate 
Body has made the well-founded point in US—Gambling that 
dictionaries “aim to catalogue all meanings of words—be those 
meanings common or rare, universal or specialized.”107 
Therefore, anything more than an initial consideration of the 
dictionary meaning would be ineffectual in establishing the one 
meaning of the text which articulates the common intention of 
the parties.108 In allocating a meaning which is in tune with the 
common intention of the parties, the context of the words takes 
on a prominent role. 
We note that the panel in Canada—Pharmaceutical Patents 
considered the meaning of “discrimination” in Article 27 for the 
 
 105. United States—Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, ¶ 7.22., 
WT/DS152/R. 
 106. TRIPS supra note 5, art. 27. 
 107. United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling 
and Betting Services, ¶ 164, WT/DS285/AB/R (emphasis added). For a definition of 
discrimination, see 4 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 758 (2d ed., 1989) (“1.a. The 
action of discriminating; the perceiving, noting, or making a distinction or difference 
between things; a distinction (made with the mind, or in action). . . . 1.c. The making 
of distinctions prejudicial to people of a different race or colour from oneself . . . . 3. 
The faculty of discriminating; the power of observing differences accurately, or of 
making exact distinctions . . . .”). For a critique of dictionary use, see Appellate Body 
Report, United States—Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to 
Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, ¶ 59, WT/DS257/AB/R, (Jan. 19, 2004); 
Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶ 92, WT/DS135/AB/R, (Mar. 12, 2001); Appellate 
Body Report, Canada—Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, ¶ 153, 
WT/DS70/AB/R (Aug. 2, 1999). 
 108. See European Communities—Customs Classification of Frozen Boneless 
Chicken Cuts, ¶ 175 WT/DS269/AB/R, WT/DS286/AB/R (“The ordinary meaning of a 
treaty term must be ascertained according to the particular circumstances of each 
case. Importantly, the ordinary meaning of a treaty term must be seen in the light of 
the intention of the parties ‘as expressed in the words used by them against the light 
of the surrounding circumstances.’” (citing LORD MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 365 
(1961)); Appellate Body Report, United States—Continued Dumping and Subsidy 
Offset Act Of 2000, ¶ 248, WT/DS217/AB/R, WT/DS234/AB/R (Jan. 16, 2003) 
(“[D]ictionaries are important guides to, not dispositive statements of, definitions of 
words appearing in agreements and legal documents.”). 
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purposes of the TRIPS Agreement, with the panel’s 
interpretation of the term seemingly agreeing with context being 
a benchmark. More specifically, as set out below, the panel 
seems to view the discovery of the meaning of discrimination as 
a relative task, taking guidance from the context of the whole 
agreement to settle on an acceptable explanation: 
The primary TRIPS provisions that deal with discrimination, such as 
the national treatment and most-favoured-nation provisions of Articles 
3 and 4, do not use the term “discrimination”. They speak in more 
precise terms. The ordinary meaning of the word “discriminate” is 
potentially broader than these more specific definitions. It certainly 
extends beyond the concept of differential treatment. It is a normative 
term, pejorative in connotation, referring to results of the unjustified 
imposition of differentially disadvantageous treatment. Discrimination 
may arise from explicitly different treatment, sometimes called “de 
jure discrimination”, but it may also arise from ostensibly identical 
treatment which, due to differences in circumstances, produces 
differentially disadvantageous effects, sometimes called “de facto 
discrimination”. . . . ”Discrimination” is a term to be avoided whenever 
more precise standards are available, and, when employed, it is a term 
to be interpreted with caution, and with care to add no more precision 
than the concept contains.109 
Even though the Appellate Body did not have the 
opportunity to weigh in on the issue, it is reasonable to assume 
that the ordinary meaning of the term “discrimination” consists 
of two elements: differential treatment and unjustified 
disadvantage.110 This is in line with the thrust of Article 27 and 
the TRIPS Agreement in general: safeguarding the availability 
of patents regardless of national boundaries. 
It is as yet not entirely clear, based on this limited analysis 
of Article 27, that the grant of a compulsory license for non-work 
of a patent satisfies the ordinary meaning of discrimination. 
There may be differential treatment for patent holders who do 
not produce in the country that granted the patent, but does the 
 
 109. Panel Report, Canada—Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, ¶ 
7.94, WT/DS114/R (Mar. 17, 2000) (emphasis added). 
 110. Although several commentators sharply criticize the panel for its 
application of discrimination to Article 30 exceptions, the two-tiered meaning of 
discrimination suggested by the panel whereby it is differentiation with an element 
of unjustified discrimination has not been subject to criticism. See generally 
Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss Diversifying Without Discrimination, supra note 67; Howse, 
supra note 67 (criticizing the interpretation of “discrimination” while supporting a 
more nuanced approach). In our opinion, the ordinary meaning of discrimination 
suggested by the panel is acceptable; however, it is our belief that the panel failed to 
properly analyze the issues under the VCLT and incorrectly imposed the 
discrimination obligation on the exceptions in Article 30 and 31. 
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treatment qualify as unjustified discrimination? 
The nature of any obligation beneath the word can only be 
determined if the ordinary meaning above tests its mettle 
against the context of the words and in line with the object and 
purpose of the agreement between parties. We reiterate at this 
point that this is necessary to achieve the requisite holistic 
interpretation of the agreement discussed above. Therefore, 
having come to an ordinary meaning of the relevant provision, 
we now seek agreement as to the meaning from the context. 
Context 
The arguments against local working requirements are held 
in place by the strength of the obligation in Article 27 of the 
TRIPS Agreement. This article is sought to be enforced as an 
absolute bar against acts by a member of TRIPS that 
discriminate on the basis of, among other things, whether 
products are imported or locally produced. But is there such a 
thing as an absolute clause?111  
The history of treaty interpretation under the VCLT and 
the Appellate Body gives a clear negative answer to this 
proposition, in favor of an interpretation in line with the treaty 
as a whole.112 For instance, the panel in Canada—
Pharmaceutical Patents answered this question specifically in 
the context of Article 27: 
[T]he context to which the Panel may have recourse for purposes of 
interpretation of specific TRIPS provisions, in this case Articles 27 and 
28, is not restricted to the text, Preamble and Annexes of the TRIPS 
Agreement itself, but also includes the provisions of the international 
instruments on intellectual property incorporated into the TRIPS 
Agreement, as well as any agreement between the parties relating to 
these agreements within the meaning of Article 31(2) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties.113 
 
 111. See Champ & Attaran, supra note 20, at 368. 
 112. Appellate Body Report, United States—Continued Existence and 
Application of Zeroing Methodology, ¶ 268, WT/DS350/AB/R (Feb. 4, 2009) (“The 
interpretative exercise is engaged so as to yield an interpretation that is harmonious 
and coherent and fits comfortably in the treaty as a whole . . . . “). See also Appellate 
Body Report, China—Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts, ¶ 151, 
WT/DS339/AB/R, WT/DS340/AB/R, WT/DS342/AB/R (Dec. 15, 2008) (stating that 
the context includes all of the text of the treaty (i.e., the WTO Agreement) and is 
relevant for a treaty interpreter to the extent that it may shed light on the 
interpretative issue to be resolved, such as the meaning of the term or phrase at 
issue). 
 113. Canada—Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, ¶ 7.14, 
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Even though the panel used permissive language such as 
“may have recourse to” above, the Appellate Body has recently 
stated that “a treaty interpreter is required to have recourse to 
context and object and purpose to elucidate the relevant 
meaning of the word or term.”114 Accordingly, we must include 
in our ordinary meaning of Article 27 consideration of a key 
provision of TRIPS in any dispute regarding local working 
requirements: Article 2 of the TRIPS Agreement, which enlivens 
the obligations owed by a state under the Paris Convention.115 
As we have already established above, Article 2 brings Article 
5(A)(2) of the Paris Convention into the fold. Moreover, it must 
be remembered that the Appellate Body has extended the non-
derogation of the Paris Convention obligations as per Article 2 of 
the TRIPS Agreement to rights granted under the Paris 
Convention.116 
This incorporation of most of the substantive parts of the 
Paris Convention into the TRIPS Agreement via Article 2 also 
addresses the issue of the two agreements being distinct 
agreements. As there is no hierarchy of norms in international 
law, the incompatibility of treaties is usually resolved, in line 
with the contractual freedom of states, by established rules of 
international law such as lex specialis derogat legi generali (the 
special prevails over general legislation) or lex posterior legi 
priori (later legislation supersedes earlier legislation).117 
In our case the later timing of the TRIPS Agreement, or the 
specificity of the Paris Convention,118 cannot be determinative 
because the two principles mentioned above (lex specialis and 
lex posterior) are resigned to the position of residuary rules, 
which take a backseat to the terms of the treaty—more 
specifically the terms of the treaty that define the relationship 
 
WT/DS114/R.  
 114. United States—Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing 
Methodology, ¶ 268, WT/DS350/AB/R (emphasis added). This is compatible with the 
use of the word “shall” in Article 31(1) and (2) of the VCLT. 
 115. TRIPS supra note 5, art. 2. 
 116. Appellate Body Report, United States—Section 211 Omnibus 
Appropriations Act of 1998, ¶ 136, WT/DS176/AB/R (Jan. 2, 2002). 
 117. Weiss, supra note 78, at 204. See PAUWELYN, supra note 33, at 96 
(discussing that a later statement must logically prevail over the prior). These rules 
find codification in Article 30 of the VCLT, which has not been formally inducted 
into the applicable rules of customary law for WTO dispute settlement. Panels and 
the Appellate Body, however, have not hesitated in referring to them when they 
have become relevant. 
 118. Arguably, the Paris Convention deals specifically with patents whereas 
TRIPS deals with intellectual property in general. 
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between instruments (i.e., Article 2 of the TRIPS Agreement). 
Ian Sinclair’s authoritative writings on the Vienna Convention, 
and treaty interpretation in general, clarify this point: 
[I]t is clear that the rules laid down in [VCLT] Article 30 are intended 
to be residuary rules – that is to say, rules which will operate in the 
absence of express treaty provisions regulating priority. . . . Sir 
Humphrey Waldock [has] confirmed ‘that the rules in paragraphs 3, 4 
and 5 were thus designed essentially as residuary rules’.119 
The panel in India—Pharmaceuticals referred to Sinclair’s 
pronouncement in confirming that for the purposes of the WTO 
DSB, “If the treaty provides for the relationship between the 
two ‘conflicting’ rules, the principle [lex specialis] no longer 
applies.”120 In that case, since a footnote to the 1994 
Understanding on Balance-of-Payments Provisions provided for 
the application of the DSU to balance-of-payments matters, the 
residuary rules of treaty interpretation could not be called upon 
to resolve any conflict.121 
The TRIPS Agreement also makes such a provision for the 
relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the 
incorporated Paris Convention. Article 2 of TRIPS explicitly 
imposes those older obligations on the future actions of the 
parties under the TRIPS Agreement: “Nothing in Parts I to IV of 
this Agreement shall derogate from existing obligations that 
Members may have to each other under the Paris 
Convention . . . .”122 
Therefore, we include, in our consideration of the scope of 
the obligation in Article 27, the provision in Article 5 of the 
Paris Convention as a non-derogable obligation imposed on each 
state party other than the one who exercises “the right to take 
legislative measures providing for the grant of compulsory 
licenses to prevent the abuses which might result from the 
exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by the patent, for 
example, failure to work.”123 It is not insignificant that members 
 
 119. SINCLAIR, supra note 92, at 97. 
 120. Panel Report, India—Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, 
Textile and Industrial Products, ¶ 4.20, WT/DS90/R (Apr. 6, 1999). In that dispute 
the panel was only concerned with the lex specialis principle, but with the 
pronouncement by Sinclair that the panel relied upon covered lex posterior as well, it 
can be presumed that the residual characteristic applies to the lex posterior principle 
as well. 
 121. Id. 
 122. TRIPS, supra note 5, art. 2. 
 123. Paris Convention, supra note 20, art. 5(A). See supra Part III.B for the 
“right” of one member being construed as an obligation on the other TRIPS members 
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decided to actively incorporate this Paris Convention remedy 
against abuse of patents into the TRIPS Agreement. As we will 
discuss below, not only is this inclusion important from a 
contextual perspective, but members also reinforced their 
distaste for abuse in the object and purpose of TRIPS. 
The preamble to TRIPS, included as context by Article 31(2) 
of the VCLT, further encourages an element of compromise in 
the construction of obligations in the Agreement. The 
significance attached to preamble language by the Appellate 
Body takes root in the opinion that the preamble is an 
indication of intention visible in the text of an Agreement: “[As] 
preambular language reflects the intentions of negotiators of the 
WTO Agreement, we believe it must add colour, texture and 
shading to our interpretation of the agreements annexed to the 
WTO Agreement . . . .”124 
In the preamble to TRIPS, members preface the agreement 
to the terms of TRIPS with several points disclosing the vision 
parties had for the rights and obligations to follow. Relevantly, 
in coming to an agreement, members “took into account the 
need to promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual 
property rights”; recognized “the underlying public policy 
objectives of national systems for the protection of intellectual 
property, including developmental and technological objectives”; 
and articulated a desire to “establish a mutually supportive 
relationship between the WTO and World Intellectual Property 
Organization.”125 
In light of these words, it is difficult to reason that such an 
interpretation of the obligation in Article 27 be adopted which 
ignores a WIPO right explicitly incorporated into the TRIPS 
Agreement and reduces the public policy space for a member 
country (most likely a developing country) to implement an 
intellectual property regime that balances its obligations under 
the WTO structure with its developmental and technological 
needs. Local working requirements, as discussed above, are 
rationalized as a tool available to states to mitigate the 
demands of intellectual property laws on public interests, which 
 
to grant that right when it is exercised. Appellate Body Report, United States—
Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, WT/DS176/AB/R (Jan. 2 2002). 
 124. Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶ 153, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998). See also Panel 
Report, Egypt—Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Steel Rebar From Turkey, ¶ 
7.154, WT/DS211/R (Aug. 8, 2002). 
 125. TRIPS, supra note 5, pmbl. 
 2010] TRIPS AND LOCAL WORKING REQUIREMENTS 311 
 
as the TRIPS preamble recognizes are private rights. 
The Doha Declaration 
Under Article 31(2) of the VCLT, the treaty interpreter is 
also required to consider any agreement or instrument relating 
to the treaty which was made between all the parties in 
connection with the conclusion of the treaty. We propose that 
the Doha Declaration is at the very least an instrument which 
provides the relevant context influencing any reading of Article 
27.126 Adopted during the WTO Ministerial Conference in Qatar 
in November 2001, the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement 
and Public Health addressed the impact that the international 
intellectual property regime was having on the public health of 
several member states. 
The membership of the WTO thus declared that the TRIPS 
Agreement “can and should be interpreted and implemented in 
a manner supportive of WTO Members’ right to protect public 
health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for 
all.”127 Further, it reinforced the public space available to 
members suffering a public health crisis and reinforced some of 
the flexibilities contained in the TRIPS Agreement (such as the 
granting of compulsory licenses).  
The question then becomes whether the Declaration, made 
four months after the United States and Brazil mutually agreed 
to a solution to the United States complaint against local 
working requirements in Brazilian patent law, would make a 
difference if it was made before the complaint was brought to 
the WTO. More specifically, how would a WTO panel or the 
Appellate Body now respond, with the Doha Declaration in the 
background, to a public health related complaint (such as one 
challenging the validity of working requirements) filed under 
the TRIPS Agreement? 
The answer is at present uncertain. Without a doubt, the 
Doha Declaration remains a diplomatic victory for the 
developing world. However, the legal weight of the Doha 
Declaration is unclear. Some members, notably the United 
States, believe that the Declaration has no legal authority 
 
 126. See Lucyk, supra note 7, at 196–99 (describing the importance of the Doha 
Declaration and the ways in which a WTO body may use it). 
 127. Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, ¶ 4, Nov. 14, 
2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755. 
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because it is a merely a diplomatic step.128 Academic 
commentary is divided, but some see the Doha Declaration as 
being of little definitive legal value: 
It should be noted that ministerial declarations within the WTO are 
not legally binding in the dispute resolution process, and in the event 
of a dispute the language of the treaties as approved by national 
governments would prevail over any contradictory declaration by the 
ministers. But the Doha Declaration is primarily interpretive of 
imprecise obligations in TRIPS, and does not appear to contradict any 
textual provision. As such, it is likely to be persuasive authority in the 
interpretation of TRIPS in the event of a dispute.129 
Arguably, however, the Doha Declaration is more than 
merely persuasive and would affect the way a panel or the 
Appellate Body decides such a case.130 We support the view that 
while the Declaration is not technically an authoritative 
interpretation under Article IX(2) of the Marrakesh 
Agreement,131 it has the look and effect of an authoritative 
interpretation.132 Moreover, the Doha Declaration was delivered 
 
 128. USTR Fact Sheet Summarizing Results from WTO Doha Meeting, (Nov. 15, 
2001), http://www.usembassy.it/file2001_11/alia/a1111516.htm (describing the 
TRIPS declaration as a “political declaration”). 
 129. Sykes, supra note 4, at 54. 
 130. See Valach, supra note 72, at 157 (describing the importance placed on the 
issue by the members of the WTO, and the subsequent weight of the declaration). 
 131. DSU, supra note 77, art. IX(2) (establishing procedure for adoption of 
authoritative interpretations of the agreement). 
 132. For further discussion, see World Health Org., Implications of the Doha 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WHO/EDM/PAR/2002.3 
(June, 2002) (prepared by Carlos M. Correa)  
[G]iven the content and mode of approval of the Doha Declaration, it can be 
argued that it has the same effects as an authoritative interpretation. In 
particular, in providing an agreed understanding on certain aspects of the 
TRIPS Agreement in paragraph 5, Members have created a binding 
precedent for future panels and Appellate Body reports.  
Id. See also Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Lothar Ehring, The Authoritative 
Interpretation Under Article IX:2 of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization: Current Law, Practice and Possible Improvements, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 
803, 816–17 (2005) (“[A]n authoritative interpretation would not have been suitable, 
given that this Declaration contained statements of a political nature, confirmed (or 
even merely referred to) existing provisions, and gave a mandate for legislative 
action.”). However, for an argument supporting the position that the Declaration is 
an interpretation under Article IX(2), see HOLGER HESTERMEYER, HUMAN RIGHTS 
AND THE WTO: THE CASE OF PATENTS AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 279–82 (2007). For 
more detailed discussion on the legal status of the Doha Declaration, see Gathii, 
supra note 128. To date, no panel or Appellate Body has had the opportunity to 
discuss the status of the Doha Declaration; however, previous panels and the 
Appellate Body have confirmed the exclusive ability of the Ministerial Conference 
and the General Council to adopt interpretations. See Appellate Body Report, United 
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by the body with the exclusive authority to issue such 
interpretations. There are also arguments supporting the view 
that the Doha Declaration was “intended as a binding waiver 
[paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article IX of the Marrakesh Agreement] 
of certain TRIPS obligations. . . .”133 
Even if the Declaration is to be viewed merely as a 
diplomatic statement carrying no legal weight, the Appellate 
Body would undoubtedly find it necessary to consider and 
discuss the impact of the Declaration. Moreover, even if such 
discussion is limited to the Declaration forming part of the 
context in which the obligation against discrimination exists, it 
demonstrates that Article 27 exists as a mere part of an 
agreement that is balanced by enforceable flexibility. 
The obligation in Article 27 operates in an environment 
where the other provisions of the treaty, the preamble of the 
treaty, and an instrument completed in relation to the treaty all 
indicate that the operation of any provision must be 
sympathetic to the kind of concerns addressed by local working 
requirements. When viewed in totality, it becomes difficult to 
conclude that the differential treatment resulting from local 
working requirements amounts to an unjustified disadvantage 
(this is especially the case when non-work of a patent has 
significant public health consequences). 
Pursuant to the foregoing discussion, we conclude that the 
ordinary meaning of the term “discrimination,” in context, casts 
serious doubt on the proposition that local working 
requirements breach Article 27. Although the imposition of local 
working requirements may result in differential treatment, the 
context of Article 27 precludes a finding of unjustified 
discrimination. 
We now proceed to the impact that the object and purpose of 
an agreement can have on a WTO panel or Appellate Body’s 
interpretation. 
 
States—Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, 
WT/DS33/AB/R (Apr. 25, 1997) at 17-20; Appellate Body Report, Japan—Taxes on 
Alcoholic Beverages , WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996) 
at 12-15. 
 133. Mitchell and Voon, supra note 88, at 581. The Marrakesh Agreement 
states, “In exceptional circumstances, the Ministerial Conference may decide to 
waive an obligation imposed on a Member by this Agreement or any of the 
Multilateral Trade Agreements . . . .” DSU supra note 77, art. IX(3). 
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2  Object and Purpose 
Earlier in Part IV.A, we looked at the complication that this 
element of the teleological interpretation brought to the 
decision-makers in the WTO. We now know that, uneasy or not, 
a compromise must be reached between the textualism 
demanded from a treaty interpreter and the “object and 
purpose” as necessary considerations in interpretation.134 This 
was cemented in the Doha Declaration, which reinforced the 
flexibilities available under TRIPS for members seeking to 
address public health issues: “In applying the customary rules of 
interpretation of public international law, each provision of the 
TRIPS Agreement shall be read in the light of the object and 
purpose of the Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its 
objectives and principles.”135 
These objectives and principles are as follows: 
TRIPS Article 7 Objectives: 
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should 
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the 
transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of 
producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner 
conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights 
and obligations. 
TRIPS Article 8 Principles: 
1. Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and 
regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect public health and 
nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital 
importance to their socio-economic and technological development, 
provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of this 
Agreement. 
2. Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the 
provisions of this Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of 
intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to practices 
which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the 
international transfer of technology.136 
It is worth mentioning that the Appellate Body has held 
that in an interpretation under the VCLT, the object and 
 
 134. Appellate Body Report, United States—Continued Existence and 
Application of Zeroing Methodology, ¶ 268, WT/DS350/AB/R (Feb. 4, 2009) (“[A] 
treaty interpreter is required to have recourse to context and object and purpose to 
elucidate the relevant meaning of the word or term.”). 
 135. Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, supra note 
127, ¶ 5(a). 
 136. TRIPS, supra note 5, arts. 7–8. 
 2010] TRIPS AND LOCAL WORKING REQUIREMENTS 315 
 
purpose to be considered is that of the entire treaty and not just 
the object and purpose of a particular provision:137 
[W]e caution against interpreting WTO law in the light of the 
purported “object and purpose” of specific provisions, paragraphs or 
subparagraphs of the WTO agreements, or tariff headings in 
Schedules, in isolation from the object and purpose of the treaty on the 
whole. Even if, arguendo, one could rely on the specific “object and 
purpose” of heading 02.10 of the EC Schedule in isolation, we would 
share the Panel’s view that “one Member’s unilateral object and 
purpose for the conclusion of a tariff commitment cannot form the 
basis” for an interpretation of that commitment, because 
interpretation in the light of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna 
Convention must focus on ascertaining the common intentions of the 
parties.138 
This interpretation further underpins the dismissal of the 
idea that a provision in TRIPS or another WTO agreement can 
be absolute or untempered by its context. 
The question of how the treaty interpreter is expected to 
maintain an allegiance to the textual approach of interpretation 
while necessarily considering the teleological element of object 
and purpose must now be addressed. As discussed earlier, it is 
not an exercise in ticking boxes in order to reach a validly 
considered interpretation. Rather it is an exercise in holistic 
interpretation to give effect to the requirement regarding object 
and purpose. We therefore start with the ordinary meaning in 
context. Once this meaning is understood, the interpreter must 
connect that meaning to the case at hand in order to reach the 
conclusion. The role of the object and purpose is the third point 
of reference which proves the conclusion. This secondary nature 
of object and purpose clears the way for a complete, and yet 
textual, analysis in treaty interpretation.139 
 
 137. Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Customs Classification of 
Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts, ¶ 239, WT/DS269/AB/R, WT/DS286/AB/R (Sept. 12, 
2005). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Sinclair, who participated in the Vienna Conference where the VCLT was 
finalized, noted: 
[T]he object and purpose of the treaty is, as it were, a secondary or 
ancillary process in the application of the general rule on interpretation. 
The initial search is for the ‘ordinary meaning’ to be given to the terms of 
the treaty in their ‘context’; it is in the light of the object and purpose of the 
treaty that the initial and preliminary conclusion must be tested and either 
confirmed or modified. . . . A number of authors consider that the search for 
the object and purpose of a treaty is in reality a search for the common 
intentions of the parties who drew up the treaty. This approach has certain 
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We now return to the original meaning, in context, viewed 
through the prism of object and purpose. We saw above that the 
obligation against discrimination in Article 27 exists in the 
context of a right to grant compulsory licenses in cases where 
the patent was abused by non-work; preambular support for 
cooperation between WIPO and WTO; and, particularly for 
patents on pharmaceuticals, the Doha Declaration which allows 
member states to interpret TRIPS to promote access to 
medicine, particularly through compulsory licensing. Therefore 
the second limb of the discrimination obligation in Article 27, 
unjustified disadvantage, becomes relevant. It demands more 
than the differential treatment (the first limb of the 
discrimination obligation) that results from local working 
requirements. Having examined the ordinary meaning in 
context, the conclusion we reach is that such unjustified 
disadvantage is difficult to find in circumstances where states 
call upon local working requirements. Put simply, the context 
justifies the treatment. 
Our conclusion is supported by the objectives and principles 
of the TRIPS Agreement, as articulated in Articles 7 and 8. The 
objectives seek a balance between the intellectual property 
rights and obligations, and particularly mention the objective of 
intellectual property rights to promote “technological innovation 
and the transfer and dissemination of technology.”140 This 
summarizes the rationale of local working requirements. The 
principles of TRIPS, equivalent to the purpose of the agreement, 
voice flexibility for members seeking to protect public health 
and nutrition and promoting technological development. Such 
flexibility for the protection of public health echoes key concerns 
of countries seeking to utilize local working requirements. 
A balance is required under the ordinary meaning in 
context, in line with the object and purpose. Allowing the 
absolute operation of the obligation under Article 27 will 
impinge on the balance that is sought by the TRIPS Agreement 
and lead to a conclusion that ignores the context of the provision 
and the guidance of object and purpose.141 Such a reading will 
 
dangers. . . . The text is the expression of the intention of the parties; and it 
is to that expression of intent that one must first look.  
SINCLAIR, supra note 92, at 130–31 (citations omitted). 
 140. TRIPS, supra note 5, art. 8. 
 141. Commentators have criticized the panel in Canada—Pharmaceutical 
Patents for failing to provide sufficient interpretive weight to Articles 7 and 8 of 
TRIPS, and instead relying on the negotiating history of the parties. See generally 
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therefore subvert the intention of the parties to the agreement 
(as articulated in the text of the Agreement). 
3. Conflict Avoidance—Good Faith Interpretation 
The amorphous requirement of good faith in treaty 
interpretation operates with little guidance. This is possibly 
indicative of a reluctance in the dispute settlement bodies to 
police the open ended phrase.142 However, certain international 
rules of interpretation, which are not explicitly included in the 
VCLT armory, are used by the dispute settlement bodies to 
infuse “good faith” into their deliberation.143 These rules also 
play the additional role of providing a basis for compromise and 
balance between seemingly conflicting provisions through 
conflict avoidance. 
As a word of caution before continuing onto the rules of 
interpretation that are used in apparent fulfillment of the good 
faith requirement, particularly the principle of effectiveness, we 
note that those rules have been questioned for the broad 
discretion that they impart to judges. The risk of activism and a 
teleological reading must be borne when applying these rules 
too broadly.144 
 
Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, Diversifying without Discrimination, supra note 67; Howse, 
supra note 67. 
 142. See Panel Report, United States—Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, 
¶ 7.64, WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999) (“It is notoriously difficult, or at least delicate, 
to construe the requirement of the Vienna Convention that a treaty shall be 
interpreted in good faith in third party dispute resolution, not least because of the 
possible imputation of bad faith to one of the parties. We prefer, thus, to consider 
which interpretation suggests ‘better faith’ and to deal only briefly with this element 
of interpretation.”); ASIF H. QURESHI, INTERPRETING WTO AGREEMENTS: PROBLEMS 
AND PERSPECTIVES 14 (2006). 
 143. See Lennard, supra note 11, at 55. 
 144. Id. at 60 (“Ultimately, the goal of ‘effectiveness’ is one to be sought, but one 
which will have to be treated with some caution in WTO jurisprudence for an 
additional reason; if the principle is given too large a scope it can amount to a broad 
teleological approach, reading things into the treaty that lend an air of neatness and 
regularity in pursuit of a perceived object and purpose, but do not flow from its 
terms and do not represent a good faith, fundamentally textual, interpretation.”) 
(citing Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Eighteen 
Session, 2 Y.B. Int’l. Comm’n. 219, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.1); Helge 
Elisabeth Zeitler, Good Faith in the WTO Jurisprudence – Necessary Balancing 
Element or an Open Door to Judicial Activism?, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 721, 729 (2005) 
(noting that effective interpretation allows for potential judicial activism). 
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a. Presumption Against Conflict 
The presumption against conflict rule is a fairly self-
explanatory rule that merely champions the view that “[i]t 
seems reasonable to start from a general presumption against 
conflict.”145 In interpreting treaty provisions, the view to be 
taken is that unless there is explicit language verifying a 
deviation in the new legal norm from the existing one, states do 
not simply “change their minds.”146 
This presumption has been applied by the panel in US—
Copyright Act, a dispute with facts similar to the question of the 
local working requirements to the extent that it involved the 
interaction of provisions in TRIPS and a WIPO treaty. We quote 
the panel here and note that each of the statements made 
regarding the Berne Convention’s place in the multilateral 
copyright regime also holds true for the Paris Convention (a 
WIPO treaty) and patent law: 
In the area of copyright, the Berne Convention and the TRIPS 
Agreement form the overall framework for multilateral protection. 
Most WTO Members are also parties to the Berne Convention. We 
recall that it is a general principle of interpretation to adopt the 
meaning that reconciles the texts of different treaties and avoids a 
conflict between them. Accordingly, one should avoid interpreting the 
TRIPS Agreement to mean something different than the Berne 
Convention except where this is explicitly provided for. This principle is 
in conformity with the public international law presumption against 
conflicts, which has been applied by WTO panels and the Appellate 
Body in a number of cases.147 
From the perspective of this presumption, in good faith, one 
might suggest that the panel/Appellate Body should focus on the 
absence of an explicit provision allowing for a divergence in 
rights or obligations in the newer TRIPS Article 27 from the 
existing Paris Convention Article 5. However, TRIPS explicitly 
maintains the applicability of the relevant provision of the Paris 
Convention. The presumption against conflict thus operates “to 
avoid interpreting the TRIPS Agreement to mean something 
different than the [Paris] Convention” since there is no explicit 
 
 145. Jenks, supra note 41, at 427; see also Panel Report, Indonesia—Certain 
Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, ¶ 14.28, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, 
WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R (July 2, 1998) (“[I]n public international law there is a 
presumption against conflict.”). 
 146. PAUWELYN, supra note 33, at 240. 
 147. Panel Report, United States—Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, ¶ 
6.66, WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000) (emphasis added). 
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provision demanding an incompatible reading of the 
provisions.148 Analysis of the presumption would then reveal 
that the members did not “just change their mind” about the 
availability of compulsory licenses for non-work of a patent 
when they agreed to the TRIPS Agreement. 
Thus a good faith interpretation, in line with the 
presumption against conflict, requires us to give due 
consideration to the lack of an explicit provision revoking or 
altering the right in the Paris Convention that allows local 
working requirements. The presumption against conflict 
compels the maintenance of that right in Article 5(A)(2) of the 
Paris Convention, despite the TRIPS obligation of non-
discrimination in Article 27.149 
b. Ut Res Magis Valeat Quam Pereat 
We now move to another general rule of interpretation, the 
principle of effectiveness, which the panel in US—Gambling 
correlated to the requirement of good faith,150 and the 
International Law Commission viewed as the potential 
embodiment of good faith in the VCLT.151 This principle seems 
 
 148. Id. 
 149. See Case of the S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 19 
(“It does not, however, follow that international law prohibits a State . . . in respect 
of any case . . . in which it cannot rely on some permissive rule of international law. 
Such a view would only be tenable if international law contained a general 
prohibition to States . . . and if, as an exception to this general prohibition, it allowed 
States to do [the act] in certain specific cases.”) (emphasis added). 
 150. Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting The Cross-Border Supply 
of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ 6.49, WT/DS285/R (Nov. 24, 2004) (“The 
requirement that a treaty be interpreted in ‘good faith’ can be correlated with the 
principle of ‘effective treaty interpretation’,[sic] according to which all terms of a 
treaty must be given a meaning.”); see also Appellate Body Report, United States—
Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, ¶ 271, WT/DS217/AB/R, 
WT/DS234/AB/R (Jan. 16, 2003); Appellate Body Report, United States—Section 211 
Omnibus Appropriations Act Of 1998, ¶ 338, WT/DS176/AB/R (Jan. 2, 2002); 
Appellate Body Report, Korea—Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain 
Dairy Products, ¶ 81, WT/DS98/R (June 21, 1999); Appellate Body Report, 
Argentina—Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and Other 
Items, ¶¶ 81, 95, WT/DS56/AB/R (Mar. 27, 1998); Appellate Body Report, United 
States—Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-made Fibre Underwear, ¶ 15, 
WT/DS24/AB/R (Feb. 10, 1997); Appellate Body Report, Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic 
Beverages II, 12, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996). 
 151. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Eighteen 
Session, 2 Y.B. Int’l. Comm’n. 219, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.1; see also 
Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II, 11 n.21, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, 
WT/DS11/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996) (referring to the International Law Commission 
Commentary: “When a treaty is open to two interpretations one of which does and 
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to be the means for the implementation of the presumption 
against conflict; the step to be taken once the treaty interpreter 
accepts the responsibility of that presumption. The Appellate 
Body in US—Gasoline understood the principle to prescribe 
“that interpretation must give meaning and effect to all the 
terms of the treaty. An interpreter is not free to adopt a reading 
that would result in reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a 
treaty to redundancy or inutility.”152 
The good faith interpretation in line with this principle 
would be supported by the move towards a holistic 
interpretation (see Part IV.A) as it attempts to avoid conflict 
between provisions by preferring the interpretation that gives 
effect to all terms of the treaty. In this way, the principle of 
effectiveness also acts as a boundary to the presumption against 
conflict, i.e., “if a harmonious reading of the two norms is not 
feasible within the realm of treaty interpretation, the 
presumption must be seen as rebutted and the existence of 
conflict acknowledged.”153 
This principle provides an interesting perspective for local 
working requirements. In the absence of a provision allowing for 
an exception from the obligations contained in Article 27, it can 
be argued that choosing to honor the right in Article 2 
(incorporating Article 5 of the Paris Convention) reduces the 
effect granted to an obligation Article 27. 
In addressing this argument, we must first consider 
whether the discrimination obligation contained in Article 27, 
construed through ordinary meaning in context, is offended by 
local working requirements. From the discussion above it is 
apparent that the TRIPS Agreement contains several 
flexibilities that enable members to address public health 
issues. As the flexibilities built into the Agreement are no doubt 
justified, it is doubtful whether the second limb of the ordinary 
meaning of discrimination—unjustified disadvantage—can be 
met. This added limb in the construction of the word 
discrimination rebuts the argument of redundancy by limiting 
the intended operation of Article 27: 
On closer analysis, it is not true that Article 27(1) must be set at 
 
the other does not enable the treaty to have appropriate effects, good faith and the 
objects and purposes of the treaty demand that the former interpretation should be 
adopted.”). 
 152. Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline, 21, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996). 
 153. PAUWELYN, supra note 33, at 251. 
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naught and reduced to “redundancy or inutility”. . . . [D]iscrimination, 
which is prohibited, stands in distinction to differential treatment, 
which is not. Rather, discrimination in law ordinarily consists of the 
subset of differential treatment that is ‘unjustified’ or arbitrary (i.e. a 
difference maintained without relevant reasons).154 
We accept that the requirement to interpret the treaty to 
satisfy good faith in interpretation does not allow one to ignore 
provisions in a treaty. However, strengthening provisions 
beyond their intended operation, as is the case for Article 27 and 
local working requirements, would subvert the requirement of 
good faith under the guise of giving full effect to a particular 
provision. 
c. In Dubio Mutius 
We now briefly discuss the conflict avoidance principle of in 
dubio mutius, which is properly characterized as a principle of 
supplementary interpretation rather than a principle of good 
faith. The place of the supplementary materials, according to 
Article 32, is strictly secondary and limited to circumstances 
where applying Article 31 of the VCLT yields an interpretation 
where terms remain ambiguous or obscure, or the result 
reached is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. We do not believe 
that the result in the situation of local working requirements 
yields such a manifestly absurd or unreasonable result, and it is 
for this reason that we do not consider a full exploration of 
interpretation in line with supplementary means to be 
necessary in this paper. However, in dubio mutius is a principle 
directly relevant to the local working requirements problem and 
is therefore discussed here. 
The Appellate Body in EC—Hormones characterized the 
principle as follows: “We cannot lightly assume that sovereign 
states intended to impose upon themselves the more onerous, 
rather than the less burdensome, obligation by mandating 
 
 154. Champ & Attaran, supra note 21, at 389. We also note that although there 
is no specific provision creating an exception for local working requirements in the 
TRIPS Agreement, other than in Article 5A of the Paris Convention, as incorporated 
into TRIPS by Article 2, Article 30 TRIPS, titled “Exceptions to Rights Conferred,” is 
a general exception. Given the support for local working requirements under the 
flexibilities built into the TRIPS Agreement, Article 30 as a general exception is 
likely capable of carving out the right in Article 5A of the Paris Convention as a 
“reasonable” reduction in the effect given to Article 27. See, e.g., Panel Report, 
Canada—Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114/R, (Mar. 17, 
2000). 
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conformity or compliance with such standards, guidelines and 
recommendations.”155 
The public policy space that local working requirements 
seek to protect for states is encapsulated as a right in Article 2 
(in conjunction with Article 5 of the Paris Convention). Article 
27 on the other hand has the opposite intention of placing an 
obligation on the state. In line with in dubio mutius, the nature 
of the obligation in Article 27, to the extent that there is an 
ambiguity, will be read down to prefer the less onerous 
interpretation of the treaty. As discussed above, the ordinary 
meaning of Article 27 guides one to an interpretation where the 
term “discrimination” requires more than mere differential 
treatment, it requires something more pejorative.  
As confirmed by the process of treaty interpretation above, 
this less onerous interpretation also benefits from the in dubio 
mutius principle.156 With this confirmation from a principle of 
supplementary interpretation, we complete our consideration of 
treaty interpretation. It reinforces the outcome achieved from 
the analysis of treaty interpretation, primary interpretation in 
Article 31 of the VCLT and hints that the sought “solution” to 
the problem may be nigh. 
B. DOES “THE ONE” EXIST? 
The challenge that the Appellate Body has set for 
interpreting WTO Agreements is to find the one proper meaning 
of the treaty provisions in question—the one meaning which is 
at once at harmony with each of the other terms of the treaty, 
 
 155. Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones), ¶ 64 n. 154, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, (Jan. 16, 1998). The 
interpretative principle of in dubio mitius, widely recognized in international law as 
a “supplementary means of interpretation,” has been expressed in the following 
terms: 
The principle of in dubio mitius applies in interpreting treaties, in 
deference to the sovereignty of states. If the meaning of a term is 
ambiguous, that meaning is to be preferred which is less onerous to the 
party assuming an obligation, or which interferes less with the territorial 
and personal supremacy of a party, or involves less general restrictions 
upon the parties. 
Id.; OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 1278 (Robert. Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 
9th ed. vol. I, 1992). 
 156. We note here that parties, especially respondents, are likely to treat this 
principle with caution given that narrowing obligations for the benefit of a 
particular situation may work against their interests in the future when they seek 
to enforce a different obligation. 
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the context of the provisions, and the object and purpose of the 
treaty.157 This removes the possibility of selecting between 
several plausible, competing interpretations and instead 
requires the interpreter to embark on the search for “the one.” 
Our examination of the issues indicates that it is not 
possible under a VCLT analysis to interpret local working 
requirements as violating the discrimination provision of Article 
27 of the TRIPS Agreement. Is it then a possibility that the 
rights in Article 2 of TRIPS are superimposed on the obligation 
in Article 27? Or is it necessary to accept that the interpretive 
conflict avoidance is insufficient to avoid a genuine conflict 
between the rights in Article 5(A) Paris Convention and TRIPS 
Article 27, in which case “the one” might not exist?  
We consider these possibilities because it is important to 
remain cognizant of the limits of treaty interpretation in that it 
“will not suffice to reconcile clearly irreconcilable 
provision . . . [it] may eliminate certain potential conflicts; it 
cannot eliminate the problem of conflict.”158 At the same time, 
the DSU has been read such that the Appellate Body is not at 
liberty to “avoid making a legal judgment by seeking sanctuary 
in non liquet.”159 
The Appellate Body has noted that treaty interpretation 
cannot go beyond or against the clear meaning of provisions in a 
treaty; in other words, it cannot extend to creating new rules.160 
Pauwelyn states that in order for treaty interpretation to have a 
role in coming to a resolution the provisions must be capable of 
being interpreted in reference to each other: 
[F]or a WTO rule to be interpreted with reference to another, allegedly 
conflicting rule the WTO provision must, first of all, include terms that 
are broad and ambiguous enough to allow the input of other rules. In 
addition, the other rule must say something about what the WTO term 
should mean, that is there must be a hook up with the WTO term for 
other rule to impart meaning in the process of interpretation. The 
 
 157. Appellate Body Report, United States—Continued Existence and 
Application of Zeroing Methodology, ¶ 268, WT/DS350/AB/R (Feb. 4, 2009). 
 158. Jenks, supra note 41, at 429. 
 159. Bacchus, supra note 6, at 507. 
 160. Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Measures on Certain 
Products from the European Communities, ¶ 92, WT/DS165/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000) 
(“Determining what the rules and procedures of the DSU ought to be is not our 
responsibility nor the responsibility of panels; it is clearly the responsibility solely of 
the Members of the WTO.”); see also Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures 
Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, 19, WT/DS33/AB/R 
(May 23, 1997). 
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other rule, must in other words, be relevant to the WTO rule.161 
Interestingly, such a hook-up exists in the case of local 
working requirements in the form of Article 2.2 of the TRIPS 
Agreement. The right of a state to impose local working 
requirements sits as a non-derogable obligation,162 
notwithstanding certain provisions of the TRIPS Agreement.163 
The relationship set out in the TRIPS Agreement (that the 
relevant provisions of the Paris Convention are both rights and 
obligations in the TRIPS Agreement) removes the escape route 
of a genuine conflict unsolvable by treaty interpretation. 
Therefore we can search for “the one” through the process of 
treaty interpretation followed above. 
The process of treaty interpretation leads us to conclude 
that as a matter of law Article 27 is not exclusive or inviolate. It 
also demonstrates that local working requirements are not 
inconsistent with the TRIPS Agreement. This is an important 
result, because if local working requirements were deemed to 
violate Article 27, it would be incumbent upon the respondent to 
prove that an exception existed.164 As it stands, however, the 
burden of proof is on the complainant to demonstrate the 
illegality of local working requirements.165 In order to do so, the 
complainant must demonstrate that the context of the provision 
 
 161. PAUWELYN, supra note 33, at 245. 
 162. See Appellate Body Report, United States—Section 211 Omnibus 
Appropriations Act of 1998, ¶ 136, WT/DS176/AB/R (Jan. 2, 2002) (“[A]dditional 
rights that WTO Members are obliged to confer on that applicant under [the Paris 
Convention].”) (emphasis added). 
 163. TRIPS, supra note 5, art. 2.2 (“Nothing in Parts I to IV of this Agreement 
[i.e., including Article 27 TRIPS Agreement] shall derogate from existing obligations 
that Members may have to each other under the Paris Convention . . . .”). 
 164. See generally SIMON LESTER & BRYAN MERCURIO, WORLD TRADE LAW: 
TEXT, MATERIALS AND COMMENTARY 191 (2008) (providing information on burden of 
proof in WTO dispute settlement proceedings); WorldTradeLaw.net, Case Law 
Index, http://www.worldtradelaw.net/dsc/wtoindex.htm#burden (subscription 
required) (containing references to all WTO disputes where burden of proof was an 
issue); see also Panel Report, United States—Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 
1974, ¶ 7.14, WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999); Panel Report, Turkey—Restrictions on 
Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, ¶ 9.57, WT/DS34/R (May 31, 1999). 
 165. Decision by the Arbitrators, European Communities—Measures Concerning 
Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Original Complaint by the United States, 
Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities Under Article 22.6 of the DSU, 
¶ 9, WT/DS26/ARB (July 12, 1999) (“WTO Members, as sovereign entities, can be 
presumed to act in conformity with their WTO obligations. A party claiming that a 
Member has acted inconsistently with WTO rules bears the burden of proving that 
inconsistency.”) (emphasis added). See also Joost Pauwelyn, Evidence, Proof and 
Persuasion in WTO Dispute Settlement, Who bears the Burden?, 1 J. INT’L ECON. L. 
227 (1998). 
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(particularly the Doha Declaration and the explicitly 
incorporated Paris Convention right in favor of local working 
requirements), the object and purpose of the agreement and 
principles of good faith, are all insufficient in establishing that 
the pejorative connotations of discrimination do not apply. 
Based on the analysis presented in this Article, it seems 
highly unlikely that a complainant can meet this burden; and 
thus, “the one” is revealed. The obligation in Article 27 must be 
read in conjunction with Article 2.2 (incorporating Article 
5(A)(2) of the Paris Convention) and the Doha Declaration. 
When viewed in totality, it appears the only way in which a 
complainant can meet its burden is by applying the term 
“discrimination” to a justifiable exercise of an incorporated 
right. Such an application would be nonsensical. Thus, “the one” 
remains—Article 2.2, in conjunction with Article 5(A)(2) of the 
Paris Convention, which now stands without a competing 
provision. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Under Article 5(A)(2) of the Paris Convention, the legality of 
working requirements is beyond doubt. The drafters could have 
chosen to exclude Article 5(A)(2) for the incorporation provision 
of Article 2 of the TRIPS Agreement. Such an exclusion would 
have considerably simplified the issue—working requirements 
would very likely be deemed to be inconsistent with TRIPS 
Article 27, and an analysis under the general exceptions 
provision of Article 30 would inevitably be called upon to 
provide a solution.  
Such an analysis, however, is unnecessary as the drafters 
did incorporate Article 5(A)(2) into the TRIPS Agreement. At 
this stage, it simply does not matter whether the incorporation 
was intentional, a mistake, or the product of oversight.166 The 
fact remains that the TRIPS Agreement incorporates two 
seemingly contradictory provisions. Given the importance of 
working requirements to public health efforts in the developing 
world, it is surprising that their legality remains uncertain and 
 
 166. The wording of Article 27 was in fact heavily negotiated during the 
Uruguay Round, with the pharmaceutical industry requesting but not obtaining a 
direct prohibition of local working requirements. The language of the provision, 
therefore, is a “purposely vague” compromise (to use Professor Correa’s term) which 
allowed both sides to claim victory but ultimately left the true meaning unresolved. 
See CORREA, supra note 10. 
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in flux almost fifteen years since the advent of the TRIPS 
Agreement. 
This Article attempts to resolve the confusion through an 
analysis of the principles of treaty interpretation that guide the 
dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO. In so doing, we 
conclude that local working requirements are consistent with 
the TRIPS Agreement. This conclusion is reached through a 
comprehensive evaluation of the issue under the various 
elements of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties. When viewed holistically, it becomes clear that the 
context of the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement taken 
together with the subsequently negotiated Doha Declaration, 
the object and purpose of the TRIPS Agreement, and the 
principles of good faith point to “the one.” Domestic legislation 
providing for local working requirements does not unjustifiably 
discriminate against other members in violation of Article 27 of 
the TRIPS Agreement. 
